Generals, Admirals, and Members of Par- and it is an insult to common sense to supliament? I do not say, that they ought to pose, that men, influenced by such motives, be excluded from these situations, but, should find an additional motive in this Cawhat good will the nation, or even the tholic Bill; to suppose, that a man, who, great mass of the Catholics, derive from in these kingdoms, is at all likely to enter such a change? Very little, I believe; as a common soldier or a common sailor, and, if the Catholic clergy are to be made should be the more disposed to do it, bemore dependent than those of the church, I cause a law has been passed, which ream sure the change will be an evil. I al- moves the obstacle to his becoming a fieldways was of opinion, that this measure officer, of which he has, indeed, perhaps, alone would do Ireland no good; I have al- a better chance than he has of being enrollways understood that the great body of the ed in the Calendar of Saints, but of which Irish Catholics viewed it with indifference, the chance is so very small as never to enif not with contempt; and I do not believe, ter, even in a dream, into his mind; to that any Irish gentleman, well-informed suppose this, is something so very wild, upon the subject, will assert the contrary. that one cannot help being astonished at its "Boon!" what boon is it to the two being seriously mentioned by men of or three millions of potatoe-planters and sense.-- -But, do not those, who affect to linen weavers, who have no more chance hold this opinion, contradict themselves? ¿ of a seat in parliament than they have of a They never fail to remind us, or, rather, to belly-full of meat once a day? We have assert, that the far greater part of our sailbeen told, that this bill will bring forth the ors and soldiers are Irishmen. Now, if population of Ireland to fight our battles; this be the case, how comes it that it is so? why, if we were to believe all that we have It is always taken for granted, as Doctor heard, it is the Irish and Scotch that do Duigenan once shrewdly observed, that all now fight all our battles, or, at least, win these Irish soldiers and sailors are Catholics. all our victories. What can they do more If this be true, it seems, then, that the for us in this way? We "o' tha Sooth," protestants, against whose becoming Marhave long stood with our fingers in our shals and Commanders in Chief there is mouths, and seen all the laurels taken off no prohibition, are less eager to enter the twig by twig, by our "sister kingdoms." service than the Catholics, who are, by I shall never forget the acclamations, the law prohibited from experiencing such aduproar of boasting, in the House of Com-vancement. How will the advocates for mons, upon the news of General Graham's victory, which the Spaniards, by-the-by, spoke rather queerly of. The Scotch claimed the honour on account of the commander, and the Irish on account of the men; and there sat the 426 English members as if struck dumb. Mr. Sheridan told them how the wondrous Commander, while ly ing upon the ground in Spain, sketched out cottages for his tenantry at home. But, the barely thinking of that scene makes one sick. -The point I aim at is this: if the "true Irish heroes," as GENERAL MATHEWS called them, upon the occasion here referred to, fight our battles now; if Ireland, as others tell us, feeds us now; why make any change at all? Can she do more than fight our battles and feed us ?—The truth The great objection to the building of is, that the soldiers and sailors from the three kingdoms, are, I believe, all equally brave; and that they are, when not impressed, all induced to go into the service, with the hope of gelling more victuals and beller clothing, or of escaping something which they dread more than they dread the service. These are the causes which send men into the naval and military service;

the Bill account for this! Oh! it is a sad mockery of poor, hungry, half-naked fellows, to ascribe to them any such ridiculous motives. They act from the plain, undisguised motive of making their lives better; of getting rid of evils which they feel press upon them; and having become soldiers and sailors, they generally behave valiantly and faithfully. In gratitude for the services of Catholics, it may be just to indulge them in their religious opinions; but, I abominate the talk about their being induced to become soldiers or sailors by a Bill, which, if it becomes a law, may cause a score or two of the sons of Catholic Noblemen and Gentlemen to obtain elevated rank in the navy or the army.

the measure upon reasons like this, is, that it will produce disappointment. The people of Ireland want more than this Bill will give them. They feel the tithes, and not the prohibition to become Field marshals. I dare say, that, out of a million, you would not find one, who would not sell his reversion to a Staff for a pottle of potatoes. The measure proposed by Mr. Parnell about

urged on the Learned Judge who tried the case, and now meant to enforce on the Court for their consideration.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH asked, was the defendant in Court?

relying on the case of the King v. Lord Abingdon. He (Mr. Brougham), on the other hand, relied on the case of the King v. Wright, which occurred about three or four years afterwards. That, the Learned Judge observed, was an application for a criminal information,, and that a great distinction was held by the Court between criminal informations and common indict ments, the former being granted only as an. extraordinary remedy. In answer to this, he (Mr. Brougham) remarked, that the ground stated, by the Learned Judge was not that on which the information in that case had been refused, but, that it had been refused on its merits, all their Lordships hav ing stated that there was no ground to send the matter for trial, it not being an offence punishable at all. It was not, they all agreed, a matter of judicial inquiry, inasmuch as it was a true account of what hap pened in Parliament. The Learned Judge then distinguished from a case like the present, the cases of characters given of ser vants, on the ground, that there confidence was reposed. He (Mr. Brougham) contended that that distinction could not apply, as that was only one of the modes or means, and that there were others which equally afforded a justification, in support of which doctrine he referred to the case of Weatherston and Hawkins, First Term Reports, where Lord Mansfield and Mr. Justice Buller laid it down that the occasion on which words were used might amount to a justifi cation of these words; and that, to every libel there might be a justification from the occasion.

MR. BROUGHAM said, he was.-The offence charged against the defendant was a supposed libel in a publication, purporting to be a speech, or report of a speech, made by the defendant in the Commons House of Parliament, of which he was a Member. An indictment having been preferred against him for this offence, at the Quarter Sessions, the same was removed by CERTIORARI into this Court, and was afterwards. sent down to be tried at the last Assizes for Lancaster. At the trial he had moved to have it put off, on account of the absence of a material witness, Mr. Bennet, a Member of the House of Commons, who was present when the speech supposed to contain libellous matter was read, and who would have proved that the publication in question contained the substance of that speech. He was saved the necessity of urging this point, however, his Learned Friend, Mr. Park, the Attorney-General for the Duchy of Lancaster, having agreed to admit that the publication contained a fair report of the substance of the speech made by the defendant in Parliament. This point being settled the trial proceeded, when Mr. Smith, Printer: of the Liverpool Mercury, proved the publication, and that he had received it in a letter enclosed in an envelope from the defendant, desiring him to publish it, the publication in question being part of a speech which the defendant had delivered in the House of Commons, on the State of the Trade of Liverpool, and on the East India Company's Charter. On his cross examination, this witness admitted, that, MR. BROUGHAM said, he put it on this though he had lost the envelope, he recol- principle that there was nothing in the occaJected its contents;-that the defendant then sion on which the speech was made which complained that he had seen mistatements implied malice. He (Mr. Brougham), his of his speech in that and in other papers, objections. being over-ruled, then went to and was anxious to give the enclosed as a the Jury; and the Learned Judge, in summore correct account of what he had actu-ming up, repeated in substance, what he ally said. This was all the evidence of any importance adduced on the trial; and, on its being closed, he, (Mr. Brougham) sub, mitted to the Learned Judge, who tried the indictment, (Mr. Justice Le Blanc,) that. enough had been proved to go to the Jury, inasmuch as it was not libellous matter: and, 2dly, whatever was the nature of the publication, that enough had been proved to shew that it was a justifiable publication under the circumstances of the case. The Learned Judge was of a contrary opinion,

MR. JUSTICE BAILEY said, there the party was not a volunteer, but owed it to the public.

had already done, desiring the Jury first to be satisfied as to the fact of publication, and then to say if it was not a libel, or publica tion of a defamatory tendency. The Learn ed Judge, however, did not afterwards leave the manner of the publication entirely out of consideration. He informed the Jury, that though a Member of Parliament could not be called to account for what he spoke in the Houses of Parliament, yet, when the speech appeared in the Papers, it became a question whether it was. mali

cious or not. As to the point urged on behalf of the defendant, that he did not even know the party supposing himself aggrieved, that was of little consequence, the only fact for the consideration of the Jury was, if the publication was libellous. In his Lordship's opinion it was defamatory, and the law inferred malice from the mischievous tendency of the publication. The Jury accordingly found the Defendant Guilty.

MR. JUSTICE BAILEY observed, if it conveyed reflections against the character of the prosecutor it had been made the vehicle of slander.

MR. BROUGHAM contended, if the de- fendant had an interest in publishing the paper in question, for other purposes, it could not be said to be the vehicle of slander against the prosecutor, though he was incidentally defamed in it, or his character attacked. If the defendant had published the speech in question for other purposes, or with other views, he was not liable for what might arise incidentally from the publication. Lord Kenyon also there laid it down that the mind must be in fault. Here there were no circumstances that went to A few years after this case infer malice. of Lord Abingdon's came the case of the King v. Wright. A Criminal Information was there moved for on the part of Mr. John Horne Tooke, against a Mr. Wright, a bookseller, for publishing a Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, attributing to Mr. Horne Tooke charges of a treasonable or seditious nature, after he had been tried and acquitted of high treason. The Rule was granted in the first instance, and was afterwards very fully argued. It was not denied that the publication contained an accurate copy of the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons; and Lord Kenyon was there for discharging the Rule, on the ground that the publication was an accurate Report of what had passed in Parliament.

MR. BROUGHAM, however, now contended, that this was a publication made in such circumstances as to prevent even the possibility of inferring malice. The defendant was a Member of Parliament, and as such not responsible for what he said in the House of which he was a Member. He was the representative, not of the body by whom he was sent into Parliament alone, but of the whole community: he not only owed it to them to account for his conduct in Parliament, but it was his incumbent duty so to do: and, if that duty could be rendered more incumbent, in any one instance than in another, it must be in this very instance which had occurred on the present occasion, namely, where his conduct in Parliament had been misrepresented; in which case it became his duty to justify himself, and to set his conduct right in the eyes of the community. He should proceed, however, in the first place, to consider the case of the King and Lord Abingdon, as the Learned Judge who tried the case had made it the ground for over-ruling The case would be found. the preliminary objection taken on the trial. It appeared, in that case, that Lord Abing- in Eighth Term Reports, p. 206; and don having employed Mr. Salmon as his Lord Kenyon was there made to lay it down attorney, took occasion in the course of in-that it would be impossible for the Court to troducing into Parliament a Bill to correct improper practices in Attorneys, to introduce a string of defamatory matter against Mr. Salmon; and that he afterwards had the same defamatory matter published at his own expense in different newspapers. When the case came to be tried his Lordship appeared in Court himself without any Counsel, the information having also been granted without opposition. Lord Kenyon in charging the Jury, in that case, observed, that a Member of Parliament had a right to make speeches in Parliament, without being subject to any control; yet, that he was not to make any such speech the vehicle of slander. In this doctrine he, (Mr. B.) perfectly agreed.

MR. JUSTICE BAILEY asked, then was he to understand that the present publication was not libellous?

MR. BROUGHAM said, the speech had not been made the vehicle of slander.

admit that any proceeding in either of the
two Houses of Parliament could be of a li-
Mr. Justice Grose concur-
bellous nature.
red generally in the same opinion; and
Mr. Justice Lawrence referred to other
cases, and entered into the matter more at
large. He put the proceedings in Parlia-
ment, and in the Courts of Law on the
same footing. He referred to the case of
Currie and Walter, 1st. Bosanquet and
Puller, p. 525, in which it was held that
an accurate report of a proceeding at law
was not a libel, but, on the contrary, was
of advantage to the public, and to the ends
of justice. Such, also, that Learned Judge
conceived was the case with an accurate re-
port of a proceeding in Parliament. Such
publication was of advantage to the public,
and even to the Legislative Bodies, and
they would be deprived of that advantage
if publications of their proceedings were to
be prevented. The Learned Counsel, as

he had taken the liberty to do on the trial,
must now again submit that it was impos-
sible to distinguish the case now alluded to
from the present. The one publication was
justifiable because it had taken place in
Parliament, and because it was accurate and
true. For the same reasons, he submitted,
so was the other. In these respects both
publications were alike. What was the
proceeding in Wright's case? It was an
accurate publication of a Report of a Com-
mittee of the House of Commons. What
a
was the present proceeding? It was
speech made by a Member of the House of
Commons; in a House duly constituted;
made by him in discharge of his Parlia-
mentary duty; and to which the House
were bound to listen. The act consisted in
the Member's making the speech, and in
the House listening to it. Here it did not
happen to be either a Report or a Petition
which was laid before the House, and
which they might have disposed of as they
thought proper; but it was a statement
made by a Member in the course of obser-
vations made by him in discharge of his
Parliamentary duty, he having an incon-
testible right to make them. The House
heard what he had to say.
The pro-
ceeding was final, and was determined,
after the Member, in discharge of his duty,
had made the speech, and the House had
listened to it. If the House had so in-
clined, they might have dealt even penally
with him for making the speech. They
might have called him to order; they might
have stopped him; and, if that had not
been enough, they might have committed
him for having so spoken. In that "high-
est, most honourable and absolute Court
of Justice," he might have been committed
for exceeding his duty, as a Counsel might
in this Court. As in the Court of Com.
mon Pleas, in the case of Currie and Wal-
ter, and in this Court in the case of the
King and Wright; so, in the House of
Commons, if the Member had abused his
privilege of speech, and made it a vehicle
for abuse and slander, as in Lord Abing-
don's case, it would, to use the language
of Lord Ellenborough in the case of Bur-
dett v. Abbott, not be decent to suppose
that the House would suffer its privileges
to be abused with impunity. To argue
that the House would suffer a man to be
defamed in a speech to which they listened,
without censure or disapprobation, would
be to suppose that the House itself would
become a party to such abuse. Mr. Jus-
ice Lawrence, the Learned Counsel con-

ceived, must have had in view the judicial character o. the House, when he expressed himself as he did in the case of the King v. Wright. It was clearly pointed out in Coke, in his first Institute, where he says, "Parliament is the highest and most honourable and absolute Court of Justice in England."—" It is called Parliament because every Member of that Court should sincerely and discreetly purier la ment, for the general good of the Common Wealth;"

And such must also have been the view entertained by his Lordship on this subject, in the case of Burdett v. Abbott. It was on that ground that the House had the power of commitment. He begged here to be allowed to state, that there were 30 or 40 Resolutions of the House of Commons against strangers publishing debates, and not one Resolution on that subject relating to Members, or in which they are censured for so doing. The case of Wright was exactly against those 30 or 40 Resolutions, the Reports which he was prosecute l for publishing, have only been ordered to be printed for the use of the Members.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH said, he understood all Parliamentary papers were ordered to be printed for the use of the Members; none of them for the information of the community.

The

MR. BROUGHAM agreed that this was so; but Mr. Wright had not published the re port in question for the accommodation of the Members, but of the Public. question was, whether he was at all protected in publishing it; and on that question all those 30 or 40 resolutions against strangers might have been thrown in his teeth; but the decision went to this, that the contempt could only be taken cognizance of in Parliament, and punished there. He farther submitted, that there was here enough in the occasion of making the publication to justify it, and to have warranted the Learned Judge in sending it more strongly to the Jury, as rebutting and excluding the presumption of malice. The present was of the same description with the case of Delaney and Jones, where a public advertisement having been inserted, charging a person with suspicion of the crime of bigamy, it was held to be a justification that the defendant had an interest in making the inquiry. Here the publication was not made with a view to investigation, but still on an occasion equally capable of having good faith assigned as the cause of it, namely, that of explaining the defendant's conduct to bis constituents.