CHAPTER IV.

THEORIES OF MATERIALISM.

THE doctrine of Materialism stands equally related to the "mechanical" form of Atheism, and to the "hylozoic" form of Pantheism. It is subsumed in both, and is the fundamental postulate on which they respectively depend.

It has no natural affinity with the more "ideal" or "spiritual" form of Pantheism. We must not conclude, however, that it has no historical connection with it. For it is instructive to mark, in tracing the history of philosophic speculation, that its course resembles not so much the uniform current of a stream, as the alternate flowing and ebbing of the tide; or, if we may change the figure, that its movement may be likened to the oscillation of a pendulum, which no sooner reaches its highest elevation on the one side, than it acquires a tendency to rush to the opposite extreme on the other. There can be little doubt that the recent revival of speculative "Idealism" was the result, at least in part, of a strong reaction against the "sensational" philosophy, which had degenerated in the school of Priestley at home, and in that of Condillac abroad, into a system of gross and revolting Materialism. For the same reason, we may now, I think, anticipate a speedy reaction the other way, -a reaction against the extravagances of "idealistic" and "transcendental" speculation, and a tendency towards a more practical and matter-of-fact philosophy. This tendency,

if guided by the true spirit of the Baconian method, may give a powerful impulse to Inductive Science in all its departments; but, if biased by partial and one-sided views, may issue either in the temporary ascendancy of the Positive School, or the partial revival of some other form of Materialism.

Some such tendency might have been expected to arise as soon as Idealism should have reached its culminating point. For, on a comprehensive view of the whole history of speculative thought, we find that there are just four great systems of Metaphysics, which are perpetually recurring, as it were, in cycles. The first is the system of Dualism,—not the Dualism of Christian Theology, which speaks of God and nature, the Creator and the creature, but the Dualism of ancient Paganism, which held Matter and Spirit to be equally uncreated and eternal: the second is Materialism, which resolves all into Matter and its laws: the third is Idealism, which resolves all into Mind and its modifications: and the fourth is Pantheism, which identifies Existence with Thought, and resolves all into the Absolute.1 In the present age, Idealism is in the ascendant, and has risen to the height of Pantheism; but, by a natural reaction, many are beginning to desiderate a more substantial and practical philosophy, while the rapid progress of physical science is directing their thoughts more and more to the wonders of the material world. In these circumstances, there may be a tendency to relapse into the Materialism of the last century, which attempted to explain the whole theory of the universe by the laws of matter and motion; or at least to embrace some modification of the Positive Philosophy, which excludes all causes, whether efficient or final, from the field of human knowledge, and confines our inquiries to the mere phenomena and laws of material nature.

There are not wanting various significant indications of the

1 M. AD. FRANCK, "Rapport a l'Academie,” Preface, p. xxI.

existence of this tendency at the present day. It is sufficiently
indicated, in some quarters, by the mere omission of all refer-
ence to Mind or Spirit as distinct from Matter; and, in others,
by elaborate attempts to explain all the phenomena of life and
thought by means of physical agencies and organic laws. The
writings of Comte, Crousse, Cabanis, and Broussais, afford
ample evidence of its growing prevalence in France; and
although it has been said by a recent historian of Philosophy
that in England there has been no formal avowal, or at least
no recognized school, of Materialism, since the publication of
Dr. Thomas Brown's reply to Darwin's Zoönomia, yet there
is too much reason to believe that it was all along cherished
by not a few private thinkers, who had imbibed the spirit
of Hobbes and Priestley; and now it is beginning to speak
out, in terms too unambiguous to be misunderstood, in such
works "The Purpose of Existence" and the "Letters
"of
Atkinson and Martineau. But apart from the opinions of
individual inquirers, it must be remembered that there is a
tendency in certain studies, when exclusively pursued, to gen-
erate a frame of mind which will tempt men either to adopt
the theory of Materialism, or at least to attach undue impor-
tance to physical agencies and organic laws. This tendency
may be observed in the study of Physiology, especially when
it is combined with that of Phrenology and Animal Magnet-
ism; not that there is any necessary or strictly logical connec-
tion between these studies and Materialism, for some of their
ablest expounders, including Cabanis, Gall, and Spurzheim,
have explicitly disavowed that theory; but simply that, in
prosecuting such inquiries, the mind is insensibly led to bestow
an undue, if not exclusive, attention on the phenomena and laws

as

1 M. COMTE, "Cours," 1. 44, 89, 141; iv. 675; v. 45, 303. M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp. 16, 20, 84, 88. M. CABANIS, "Rapports du Phisique et du Moral de l'Homme," 3 vols. M. BROUSSAIS, "Traité de Physiologie appliquée a la Pathologie," 1828.

of our material organization, so as to become comparatively unmindful of what is mental, moral, and spiritual in the constitution of man. For these reasons, and considering, especially, the close connection of Materialism both with the mechanical Atheism of the past, and the hylozoic Pantheism of the present age, we deem it necessary to subject its claims to a rigorous scrutiny, in connection with the subject of our present inquiry.

What, then, is the doctrine of Materialism? What are the forms in which it has appeared, and what the ground on which it rests? How does it stand related to the question concerning the nature and existence of God, or the constitution and destiny of Man? A brief answer to these questions will be sufficient to show that this theory cannot be safely disregarded in any attempt to construct a comprehensive and conclusive argument on the first principles of Natural Theology.

SECTION I.

DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM.

The doctrine of Materialism has assumed several distinct phases or forms in the hands of its different advocates; and these must be carefully discriminated from each other, if we would either estimate aright their respective merits, or do justice to the parties by whom they have been severally maintained.

The grossest and most revolting form of Materialism is that which identifies mind with matter, and thought with motion. It denies that there is any real or radical difference between physical and moral phenomena, and affirms that life and thought are so entirely dependent on material organization, that the dissolution of the body must necessarily be the destruction of conscious existence, and that death can only be an

eternal sleep.

--

This is the doctrine of Materialism which was taught in a former age, by the author of the "Systême de la Nature," and which has recently been revived by M. Comte in France, and by Atkinson and Martineau in England. A few extracts will sufficiently illustrate its character and tendency. "Men have evidently abused the distinction," says Baron D'Holbach, "which is so often made between man physical and man moral: man moral is nothing else than that physical being considered in a certain point of view, that is, with reference to some modes of action which belong to his peculiar organization." "The universe that vast assemblage of everything that exists-exhibits nowhere anything else than matter and motion.". "If we are asked, what is man? we reply, that he is a material being, organized or framed so as to feel, to think, and to be affected in certain ways peculiar to himself, according to his organization." More recently, M. Comte has affirmed that "the subject of all our researches is one," and that "all natural phenomena are the necessary results either of the laws of extension or of the laws of motion;" while M. Crousse is quite clear that "intelligence is a property or effect of matter," and that "body and spirit together constitute matter." In our own country, Atkinson and Martineau have not shrunk from the avowal of the same doctrine, or the adoption of the most revolting consequences that can be deduced from it. "Instinct, passion, thought, are effects of organized substances."- "Mind is the consequence or product of the material man; it is not a thing having a seat or home in the brain, but it is the manifestation or expression of the brain in action, as heat and light are of fire, and fragrance of the flower."

"2

1 "Systême de la Nature," 1. 2, 10, 86, 101, and passim. This eloquent text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and refuted by M. BERGIER in his "Examen du Materialisme," 2 vols. Paris, 1771.

2 M. COMTE, "Cours," 1. 44, 141. M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp.