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CHAPTER XLV.

The Enemy Crosses Broad River on the 16th of February.-General Beauregard Orders the Evacuation of Columbia.-It is Effected on the 17th.— General Beauregard's Arrival at Ridgeway.-His Despatches to the War Department.-General Hampton's Plan to Oppose the Advance of the Enemy.-General Beauregard Goes to White Oak.-His Letter to General Lee.-He Reaches Chesterville.-His Telegram to President Davis Urging Concentration.-Remarks upon General Badeau's Interpretation of this Telegram.-Apprehension of the Enemy upon this Point.-Reasons upon which General Beauregard Founded his Advice.-His Arrival at Charlotte on the 22d.-General Lee's Despatch Giving Command of the Southern Army to General Johnston.-Impossibility of Beating Back Sherman without Reinforcements.-General Lee's Despatch to the Secretary of War. - Comments thereon. - What Colonel Taylor (Lee's Adjutant)

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Thought of the Necessity for Concentration.-General Beauregard's Plan the only Wise One.-General Johnston Assumes Command.-His View of the Situation.-General Beauregard's Answer to General Lee.—Arrival of General Johnston at Charlotte on the 24th.-Sherman's Line of March after Destroying Columbia.-Fall of Fort Fisher.-General Bragg Retreats to Goldsboro'.-His Tardy Junction with General Johnston.— Wisdom of General Beauregard's Plan Vindicated.

THE enemy effected the crossing of Broad River during the night of the 16th of February. With our small force of infantry and a few light batteries, under General Stevenson, aggregating about three thousand men, and the cavalry, under Generals Wheeler and Butler, some four thousand men, commanded by General Hampton, we had endeavored, in vain, to impede his progress. The evacuation of Columbia therefore became a necessity, and General Beauregard ordered its execution at daylight on the following morning. The infantry and artillery were to head the retreat, and the cayalry, bringing up the rear, was to file out of the city as the Federal columns should enter it. This movement was carried out to the letter with perfect system and order. The conflagration and pillage that took place after our troops had left will form the subject of another chapter.

* See letters to Generals Hampton, Stevenson, and Cheatham, in Appendix. See, also, instructions to Colonel G. W. Brent.

General Beauregard rode out of Columbia, with his staff, at 10 A. M. on the 17th, taking a northerly route towards Chester, where he thought he might still be able to form a junction with General Hardee's forces.

He arrived at Ridgeway, about twenty-five miles from Columbia, on the night of the 17th, and remained there nearly two days, giving orders to his different commands, and reporting to the President and General Lee every incident of importance connected with the movements of his troops. His first telegram to the latter read as follows:

"RIDGEWAY, S. C., Feb. 17th, 1865: 9.30 P. M.

"General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va. :

"Enemy having forced crossing of Saluda and Broad rivers above Columbia, city had to be evacuated this morning. My forces are now retiring on this place. Everything possible shall be done to retard enemy's advance, but I cannot separate cavalry from infantry without fear of disaster, owing to small number of latter-only about three thousand effectives. Moreover, having no supply trains, troops must move along railroad.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

In answer to a despatch from the Secretary of War, alleging interference with provisions at Charlotte which had been ordered to Richmond by the Commissary - General, General Beauregard immediately forwarded this telegram:

"RIDGEWAY, S. C., Feb. 17th, 1865: 9.30 P. M.

"General BRECKINRIDGE, Secy. of War, Richmond, Va. :

"Far from interfering with provisions at Charlotte Junction, I have done all I could to send everything forward from Columbia.* I advise removal of all supplies, except two hundred thousand rations, from Charlotte to a safer place farther north; no time should be lost. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 18th he informed General McLaws, who had temporarily relieved General Hardee, that Columbia had been abandoned; that Hampton's cavalry was still near the city; that the future intentions of the enemy were not yet fully ascertained; but that all instructions given to General Hardee must be rapidly carried out.

On the same day General Hampton, by despatch, proposed a plan of concentration to check the enemy's further advance. It

*See, in Appendix to preceding chapter, General Beauregard's orders to Major R. Rhett, A. Q. M., and to Captain Witherspoon, A. C. S., for removal of stores from Columbia.

was ably conceived, and, under other circumstances, might have resulted successfully. But, as Cheatham's and Hardee's troops could not have reached the designated point in time, and as the 14th Corps (Federal) had already crossed to the east of Broad River, it being probable that the 20th would cross on the next day, at Alston, General Beauregard was of opinion that, with our small forces then available, we could effect no serious damage to the 15th Federal Corps, and that our line of retreat to Chesterville might, on the other hand, be entirely cut off by the 14th and 20th Corps - thus opening an unobstructed country to the enemy through the State of South Carolina. General Hampton's suggestion, therefore, was not adopted.*

From Ridgeway, General Beauregard passed on to White Oak, where, on the 19th and 20th, he sent important instructions to Generals Hampton and Stevenson, directing their movements and line of march, and advising necessary measures for the removal of rations at Chesterville.

He also forwarded the following message to General Lee:

"General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va. :

"WHITE OAK, Feb. 19th, 1865.

"General,-After close examination and exerting every means in my power, I find it impossible for the troops now in Charleston to form a junction with me this side of Greensboro' (North Carolina). Believing it best, from the information just received from Governor Vance and General Bragg, to transport the troops by rail to that point, I have directed General McLaws to move them by rail as rapidly as possible. I am also of the opinion that Cheatham, at Newberry, this morning, with two thousand men, and Stewart, eighteen hours behind him, with twelve hundred, cannot form a junction with me except by moving across, via Statesburg and Manchester, and thence, by rail, to Greensboro'. This movement will require some days, owing to the difficulties of crossing Broad and Wateree rivers. The enemy has advanced to-day to near Winnsboro', in force, and is still moving along the railroad, keeping between this place and Broad River, thus cutting off Cheatham and Stewart. "G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

This was before the enemy had decided to move eastward. General McLaws was informed of the countermanded movement. and General Bragg, at Wilmington, was asked to communicate with and afford him all the aid in his power.

General Beauregard arrived at Chesterville on the night of the

* See Appendix.

20th. He remained there until the next day, at 10 A. M., when he left for Charlotte, N. C., having lost all hope of concentrating at Chester, with Hardee's, Cheatham's, and Stewart's forces.

From Chesterville, on the 21st, General Beauregard sent the following telegram to President Davis:

"Should enemy advance into North Carolina, towards Charlotte and Salisbury, as is now almost certain, I earnestly urge a concentration in time of at least thirty-five thousand infantry and artillery at latter point, if possible, to give him battle there and crush him; then to concentrate all forces against Grant, and then to march on Washington to dictate a peace. Hardee and myself can collect about fifteen thousand men, exclusive of Cheatham and Stewart, not likely to reach in time. If Lee and Bragg could furnish twenty thousand more, the fate of the Confederacy would be secure.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

It seems, according to Mr. Davis's book,* that this demand for reinforcements, although "implying a compliment" to General Lee, had no other result than to "disturb" him; and it is hardly necessary to add that no attention whatever was paid to it.

A curious feature of the Confederate history may here be elucidated. In his "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," General Badeau speaks of the foregoing despatch and proposed concentration in terms of complete discourtesy. He alludes to General Beauregard's ill-health at the time, and to that cause ascribes what he considers the folly of his proposition. He even connects it with the fact that on "the day after this despatch was received Johnston superseded Beauregard in command of the troops opposed to Sherman."

If it was folly on the part of General Beauregard to suggest and urge the concentration of our forces at that period—and it must not be forgotten that he had been attempting to bring it about ever since the 3d of February-it was also folly on the part of General Lee to write, in the despatch wherein he asked for the appointment of General Johnston, the following words: "It is necessary to bring out all our strength and, I fear, to unite our armies, as, separately, they do not seem able to make head against the enemy." And again: "I fear it may be necessary to abandon our

"Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 631.

+ "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. iii., p. 397.

See, in preceding chapter, General Beauregard's telegrams of that date.

cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency."* The only difference between the two generals was, that General Lee saw the necessity of concentration too late, and failed to act upon it; whereas Beauregard saw it much earlier, and would have tried to carry it to a successful conclusion, had the power been given him to execute his plans. That General Grant himself dreaded the effects of such "folly "-i. e., the concentration proposed and the demand for reinforcements by General Beauregard -is conclusively shown by the following quotation from General Badeau's book: "At this time again Grant saw reason to apprehend a movement of Lee before Richmond or Petersburg, either to screen the withdrawal of the rebel army, or to distract attention from operations elsewhere."+ And General Grant is reported to have said, on the 25th of February: "Deserters from the rebel lines, north of the James, say it is reported among them that Hill's corps has left, or is leaving, to join Beauregard." That, late as it was, the course proposed by General Beauregard was the true strategic measure to adopt, is shown by the apprehension of the enemy. And General Badeau again quotes, as follows, General Grant's words to General Meade, on the 3d of March: "For the present, it is better for us to hold the enemy where he is than to force him South. *** To drive the enemy from Richmond now would endanger the success of these columns"-meaning Sherman's and Schofield's.

And what was General Beauregard attempting to compass, with a view to a successful conclusion of the war? That the end had been nearly reached by both contending parties was evident at the time, and has been set forth, with startling certainty, by researches among the Federal archives. The desire for peace was eager all over the North; and any decisive victory or series of victories, on our part, would not only have disheartened our adversaries, by re-opening before them a vista of long and protracted struggles, with levies of men now become most exacting, but would have reanimated the whole South, and brought back thousands of absentees to our ranks. Under such circumstances,

* General Lee's communication, of February 19th, 1865, to General Breckinridge, Secretary of War, in Appendix.

↑ "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. iii., p. 394. ‡ Ibid., vol. iii., p. 395.

§ Ibid., vol. iii., p. 405.

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