8. "RALEIGH, N. C., March 29th, 1865. "Lieut.-General S. D. LEE, Chester, S. C.: "Send wagon-train by most direct route (dirt road) to Raleigh. Send your artillery to Yorkville, or best point on Broad River, for supplying men and animals. Report point selected. G. T. BEAUREGARD." On the 30th, General Johnston, by telegram from Smithfield, informed General Beauregard that a raid, reported to be Stoneman's party, four thousand strong, was on the point of reaching Lenoir's Station, and that he should communicate with Brigadier-General Bradley Johnson, at Salisbury, or, if necessary, go to that point himself, and issue all orders required to meet the emergency. General Beauregard was already advised of the rumor, and had been in correspondence with General Bradley Johnson on the subject. As a provision against the danger threatening Lenoir, he had also telegraphed General S. D. Lee, at Chester, S. C., to stop part of his forces at Salisbury, to meet and defeat the enemy. In his answer to General Johnston he acquainted him with the various dispositions he had taken, and assured him he would certainly go there, should the necessity arise. On the same day (30th) a hurried despatch was received by General Beauregard from General Johnston, emanating from the Commander-in-chief of our armies, General Robert E. Lee. A new and unforeseen danger had arisen in Western Virginia and East Tennessee, to guard against which the War Department and General Lee were, at that moment, embarrassed and distressed to no inconsiderable degree. It was an additional complication in our grave and perilous situation; a crisis requiring, it was thought, the greatest promptitude, skill, and energy. Again, as in so many other instances during the course of the war, a call was made upon General Beauregard. The despatch we refer to was in these words: "General G. T. BEAUREGARD: SMITHFIELD, March 30th, 1865. Following despatch just received: 'Can General Beauregard be spared for command of Western Virginia and East Tennessee-would the duty be agreeable to him?-R. E. LEE.' "General Lee apprehends movements in that direction by Thomas. "J. E. JOHNSTON." Without hesitation General Beauregard forwarded the following answer: "RALEIGH, N. C., March 30th, 1865. "General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. : "My preference is to remain with you as at present, for I could scarcely expect, at this juncture, to be furnished with a force at all commensurate with the exigency, or able to make headway against the enemy, reported advancing from East Tennessee towards Southwestern Virginia. A mere territorial command, substantially bereft of troops, and in which I could render no positive service, would not be agreeable, for I could not hope to be effective, whereas here I may be useful. G. T. BEAUREGARD." Thereupon General Johnston telegraphed : "I have received your despatch in reply to General Lee's offer, and read it with great pleasure. I shall forward it with the same feeling." It now appeared that the raiding party mentioned above consisted of Terry's force, not Stoneman's. General Beauregard was advised to verify the fact, through General Martin, at Asheville. Shortly afterwards General Johnston again telegraphed that Brigadier-General Bradley Johnson reported Stoneman's cavalry to be moving on the railroad, and desired that, for the present, troops should be ordered to stop at Greensboro' and Salisbury. And it might be well, he thought, for General Beauregard himself to go as far as Greensboro'-all of which he was preparing to do when he received the despatch. Ferguson's cavalry was, at the same time, hurried on from South Carolina. On that day (31st) General Beauregard also received from General Featherstone, of S. D. Lee's troops, at Salisbury, the information that he had two brigades with him, and another expected the next morning, as well as Johnson's battalion of artillery; with all of which he would begin to fortify at the bridge. He added that scouts were "scarce, and not very reliable," but that the reports made, such as they were, indicated a movement on the Danville Railroad, by Stoneman or Grierson; and, further, that he counted upon a regiment of cavalry in the course of the next night. General Beauregard, thereupon, concluded to stay at Greensboro', which he knew to be a central point, until events should assume a more definite shape, and, meanwhile, to examine into the defensive condition of the place. He reached Greensboro' late that evening. CHAPTER XLVIII. Strength of the Federal Army at Goldsboro'.-General Sherman's Reasons for Remaining there Two Weeks.-Position of the Confederate Forces.-General Beauregard's Command Extended on the 1st of April.-Dispositions Taken by him.-General Lee's Withdrawal from Petersburg.-Evacuation of Richmond.-General Beauregard Returns to Greensboro'.-Receives Despatches from Mr. Davis on the 4th and 5th.-Goes Back to Raleigh on the 7th, and to Smithfield on the 8th.-The President Urges him to Come to Danville.-Surrender of General Lec's Army.-President Davis Goes to Greensboro'.-General Beauregard Awaits him there.-Interview between them on the 11th.- President Davis's Despatches of that Day. General Beauregard's Orders to Generals Lomax, Walker, and Bradley Johnson.-President Davis Summons General Johnston to Greensboro'.-He Arrives on the 12th.-Conference between the President, his Cabinet, and the Two Generals.-General Johnston Reluctantly Authorized to Treat with General Sherman.-General Johnston Forwards Letter to General Sherman on the 14th.-Incident Mentioned of Silver Coin Transferred to General Beauregard.-General Sherman's Answer to General Johnston.-Troops Ordered to Halt at all Points.-General Beauregard's Suggestion to General Johnston concerning Negotiations.-General Breckinridge Present on the Second Day of the Conference.-Agreement Entered into between Generals Johnston and Sherman on the 18th. -General Breckinridge Communicates Paper to President Davis.—His Delay in Answering.-Letter of General Breckinridge to President Davis. -His Final Answer to General Johnston.-Despatches from General Sherman.-Death of President Lincoln.-What the South Thought of it.— General Breckinridge's Telegram of April 24th.-General Johnston's Answer.-Negotiation Renewed between Generals Johnston and Sherman.— They Meet Again at Durham's Station.-Terms Agreed upon, April 26th. -General Johnston Ignorant of the Whereabouts of President Davis.— Responsibility of Concluding Terms Thrown upon Generals Johnston and Beauregard.-President Davis's Efforts to Organize a Cavalry Escort.Circular of General Johnston to his Army on April 27th. Ar this stage of the military operations just described the main body of the Federal army, united at Goldsboro', consisted of its right wing, under General Howard, aggregating 28,834 men; its left wing, under General Slocum, aggregating 28,063 men; its centre, under General Schofield, aggregating 26,392 men, exclusive of the artillery, numbering 2443 men, with 91 guns; and the cavalry division, under General Kilpatrick, with an effective strength of 5659 men; making a grand aggregate of 91,391 men.* This estimate does not include General Stoneman's force of cavalry, amounting to 4000, then operating around Greensboro' and Salisbury, and which, though not originally belonging to General Sherman's army, was then under his command.† For about fifteen days after its junction with General Schofield this army remained quiet near Goldsboro', preparatory, as it appears, to the effort General Sherman was about to make to place it "north of Roanoke River, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac." + The small Confederate army, under General Johnston, stood between the two roads leading to Raleigh, on the one hand, and to Weldon, on the other, so as to be ahead of the enemy on whichever line of march he might adopt, and in order, also, to be able to unite with the Army of Northern Virginia, in case General Lee should favor such a movement, although it was now, probably, too late to carry it out successfully. The position was wisely selected. Wheeler's cavalry was stationed north, and Butler's south, of the enemy's camps surrounding Goldsboro'. On the 1st of April, owing to a despatch just received from General Lee, empowering him "to assume command of all troops from Western Virginia and Western North Carolina within his reach," General Beauregard left Greensboro' for Salisbury. His purpose was, if possible, to confer with Generals Lee and Johnston relative to the actual condition of affairs, and the best disposition to be made of all available troops, from Salisbury to Greensboro'. As Salisbury appeared to be less threatened than Greensboro' by the enemy's cavalry-Stoneman's-reported to be advancing from Mount Airy and Wytheville, in West VirginiaGeneral Beauregard ordered three brigades, under Featherstone, Shelly, and Gowan, with two light batteries, to move, without delay, in the direction of Greensboro', whither he returned the same evening. Soon afterwards, Stoneman appearing more di * General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 334. Our addition differs from that of General Sherman, though made up from aggregates furnished by him. He finds 88,943-a difference of 2258. It is easy to perceive that the error is not ours. t General Sherman's "Memoirs." vol. ii., p. 347. See bis answer to General Johnston, rectly to threaten Danville, which was then defended by a mere handful of troops, under General H. H. Walker, General Beauregard sent him Shelly's brigade, of some six hundred men, three batteries from Hillsboro', and also ordered thither General Wheeler's cavalry, which had been sent by General Johnston to aid in the projected movement to oppose Sherman. Just at this time occurred the too long delayed and now inevitable evacuation of Richmond (April 2d), which, in General Johnston's opinion, necessitated the recall of Wheeler's force, as General Sherman, altering his purpose to form a junction with General Grant, might be tempted to march at once upon Smithfield and Raleigh. Colonel J. F. Wheeler's cavalry was allowed, however, to proceed to Danville, where the Confederate Government had now determined to take temporary refuge, supposing— and indeed knowing-that General Lee, upon his retreat from Petersburg, would endeavor to reach Danville with his army.* The line of our defences around Petersburg was broken on the 2d of April, in the morning, and our troops were compelled to fall back on their inner works, thus making the evacuation of the city a mere question of hours. General Lee had "advised that Richmond should be evacuated simultaneously with the withdrawal of his troops that night;"+ and President Davis, informed of the disaster, began immediate preparations for his removal and that of the heads of the various State Departments from the capital of the Confederacy. He says: "The event had come before Lee had expected it, and the announcement was received by us in Richmond with sorrow and surprise; for, though it had been foreseen as a coming event which might possibly, though not probably, be averted, and such preparation as was practicable had been made to meet the contingency when it should occur, it was not believed to be so near at hand." And here it is appropriate to say that, far from lamenting the abandonment of Richmond, to which it had clung with such blind pertinacity, the Government should have ordered it weeks, if not months, previously, when the military necessity for such a movement was clearly indicated as the best-and perhaps the only-method of salvation. An effort to concentrate, at "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 668. |