And it is declared, that the money, fo to be paid, will be divifible, according to teftator's will, in equal fhares among his brother Thomas Ruffel's children, his fifter Willet's children, and his fifter Parker's children living at the time of the death of the teftator: and the Mafter was to inquire, what children they had living at the death of teftator, and which of them are dead, and whether they left any, and what perfonal reprefentatives. T. Vernon, of Hanbury Hall in Worcestershire, Efq. left the faid house and his eftates to his daughter Emma Cecil for life, remainder to her children in fucceffion in tail, remainder to the plaintiff Elizabeth Vaughan, with remainder over, and directed further that all his plate, houfhold goods, furniture, glaffes, and china, which fhould be in his house at Hanbury-Hall, fhould go as heir-looms with his real eftate, and be held and enjoyed by the perfon or perfons that shall, for the time being, by virtue of his will, be entitled to his faid reat eftate, as far as the rules of law and equity will permit, and directed an inventory of the plate to go with the estate. Mr. Cecil had a fon born by his faid wife, who died in a few weeks, whereupon the father took out administration to him and afterwards upon feparating from his wife, removed the plate from Hanbury Hall. The plaintiffs prayed an injunction to reftrain the fale of the plate, and that it might be returned to Hanbury Hall for the benefit of the perfons interested in the estate. LORD CHANCELLOR.-I am called upon to fay that the effect of this will is to prevent the ufe from fpringing, where, if it fprang, it would give an abfolute eftate. To do this, I muft determine that the ufe fhall not fpring or veft till 22 years after the death of Emma, the first taker for life. How am I to gather this? From the words "as far as the rules of law and equity will permit?" This cannot be; the uses could not go further than the law will permit. But these, words have their fenfe; for he feems to have known that the perfonal property could not go fo far as the real. The cafe of Gower v Grosvenor has the fame words: and it seems as if the reporter took the language of Lord Hardwicke ; but there is a confiderable chafm, and with what modifications that was filled up I cannot fay; but Lthink it is not neceffary to. to follow all that is there faid. Here, the eftates are given to Emma for life, remainder to the first and other fons, with remainder over, and the furniture, &c. is to go to the perfon entitled to the eftate as far as the law will permit.-The perfon entitled feems an exprefs defcription of the child of Cecil. The other cafes have had different words. In Foley v. Burnell, it was contended the word poffeffion was in oppo fition to reverfion; the ufe there did not fpring, for want of the contingency arifing on which it was to fpring. It would be pedantic to fay, that Gower v. Grofvenor turns on the words" as far as the law allows;" for they are explained by the different natures of real and perfonal estates. To do what is called for in this cafe, I must go much further than ever has been done; for I know no inftance where the conveyance has been carried to the utmost extent of what the law might do. I know conveyancers have endeavoured to frame a cafe to the utmost extent it can be carried: but here it might be suspended to 22 years after a life in being. He certainly meant the fon, if he was in poffeffion, fhould have them. What then, fhall they not be in poffeffion in the mean time, not vest in any body? Cafes which fay you shall do all this for the teftator, by faying you fhall do all that can be done, will not do. This would be fetching the intent of the teftator, in a way many cases have faid it cannot be done. The property cannot be rendered inalienable but by preventing the ufe from fpringing; which cannot be when a perfon is born who would take abfolutely. It would be a direction to keep it unalienable as long as could poffibly be. I am of opinion that the words are not fufficient to give fuch a construction, and that, confequently, I muft declare that this property vested in the fon of Emma, and goes to the father as his representative. Mary Wyvil, next of kin to Elizabeth Wyvil, who died inteftate, being infane, William Wyvil adminiftered during her infanity, and employed the defendant, who was an attorney, to colle& large fums of money due to the estate of Elizabeth, which he directed him to lay out in the funds, and which he, the defendant, informed him he had done, but which, in fact, he kept in his own hands. Mary Mary died inteftate and infane, near 20 years after EliZabeth. The plaintiff obtained letters of administration as next of kin, and William Wyvil being dead, now filed a bill of account against Southouse for an account, and paying intereft for the time he had the money, which amounted Lo £. 800. LORD CHANCELLOR-It is a clearly-established point, that the defendant has received money, but that would not have bound him, if he had not been under a duty to make intereft of it, for the benefit of the estate; because then it would only be holding the money as a banker holds it; but here was an employment, accepted by the defendant Southoufe, to lay out the money from time to time. It is faid, he is not liable, because an administrator is not bound to invest the monies in his hands, fo as to make interest: but here he has bound himself. Therefore an account must be taken of the times when he received monies belonging to the estate, and when he ought to have laid them out and he must answer interest at 4 per cent. from the times when he ought to have laid them out. CAREY . GOOD IN G.. The teftator left his brother and nephew, who were both indebted to him in large fums, £.500 each, appointed them executors, and named no refiduary legatee. The plaintiff was next of kin, and prayed payment of the debts the executors owed the teftator. It was argued that their appointment as executors extinguifhed the debt. LORD CHANCELLOR. It is a fettled point in this Court, that the appointment of the debtor executor, is no more than parting with the action. This is a truft for the next of kin. The The EARL OF ABINGDON . BUTLER and PENSON. The defendant Butler held a leafe upon three lives under the plaintiff in the manor of Cumner. The other defendant was fteward of the manor. Butler being minded to put his fons' lives into the leafe, applied to the fteward for that purpofe. This eftate was valued in the steward's book at upwards of 100 a year, and the rule of the manor was to affefs 7 years purchase upon the lapfe of two lives. Two of the lives named in the old leafe were deceased: but the plaintiff was lead to think that only one life was lapsed, and accordingly was induced to execute a new leafe for the lives of the defendant's three fons, upon payment of £.200 as for one life lapfed, and one exchanged. The plaintiff prayed that Butler fhould pay the further fum of £.616, upon the ground that the leafe was fraudulently obtained, and in default that the steward should pay the fame. The LORD CHANCELLOR faid this was a palpable fraud, and decreed that an account should be taken of the value of the leafe at the time of its execution; that the defendant Butler should pay that value with the costs of the fuit: and that, in default of his payment, the deficiency fhould be made good by Penfon, the other defendant, who fhould pay his own costs. CROWE V. BALLAR D. 1000 after The plaintiff By the will of the Earl of Litchfield, the plaintiff, Robert Crowe, Efq. was entitled to a legacy of the death of Lady Litchfield, aged 69 years. was about 22 years of age, and being preffed for money, the defendant undertook to fell the legacy for him to the best advantage; and told him he had fold it for .300, which was the most he could get, to a Mr. Toft; but it turned out, in fact, that Toft was only à nominal, and that the defendant was the real, purchaser. Two years after, Lady Litchfield died; and the plaintiff, to hide this tranfaction from his father, applied to Ballard, who who faid he had bought Toft's intereft in the legacy, and propofed to relinquish it upon receiving a joint poft obit bond from the plaintiff and his brother for the payment of £1800 upon the death of their father, who was then 63 years of age. In this bond there was a condition underwritten, reciting that the plaintiffs ftood indebted to defendant in .900, conditioned for payment of £.1800, in cafe either of them fhould furvive the father: but, in fact, no fuch debt of £.900 fubfifted. After the father's death, which happened in two years, the plaintiff Robert came into poffeffion of £3000 a year; the defendant applied for payment of the bond, but the plaintiffs being unable to pay it, a money-bond was given for the £1800, and intereft at 5 per cent. and he paid 4 years intereft on the bond; the defendant afterwards arrefted the plaintiff, and he filed this bill, praying that, upon payment of the money really advanced, the defendant might deliver up the bond to be cancelled. LORD CHANCELLOR.-This cafe lies in a narrow compafs. The plaintiff was a young man entitled to a legacy of £1000 upon the death of Lady Litchfield, who was 69 years of age. Ballard undertakes to fell the legacy, and pretends he took great pains fo to do; but it is in evidence that he represented it as a very hazardous bufinefs. Then be buys it himself. This is alone fufficient to fet afide the tranfaction. It is impoffible, at any rate, that the perfon employed to fell can be permitted to buy. Even if this was done with the knowledge of the party felling, it could not be fupported. That principle muft prevail, even if he had bought fairly. He paid the money, as advanced by the perfon who had purchased. The whole, according to his own anfwer, was 310: of this 49 is denied. It is as oppreffive a tranfaction as can be conceived. Then, the confideration of the post-obit bond-then, as to the fubfequent bond being a confirmation, I am at a lofs upon what principle courts have spoken of confirmations. If a grntleman of rank, fortune, and honour, under age, in diftrefs, or otherwife, gives a bond; and afterwards conceives that he has made a hard bargain, and, knowing that the bond is bad, will give a new bond, that will maintain the posfeffion of the right of the holder of the bond, and the act fhall be faid to be a confirmation; but not any act done under the influence of the former tranfaction, and the opinion that that bond is good. Here the bond was not given freely, but under the influence of the former transaction. I do not remember the cafe cited (Norris v. Rudd), but it VOL. II. must T |