law, Metellus Scipio, to be associated with him. He had restored order in the city, he had given the tribunals a semblance of purity and justice, and the Senate seemed under his protection to recover a portion at least of its outward dignity. Before quitting office he took care to prevent the succession of Cato to the consulship, which he got conferred upon Serv. Sulpicius, a noble of high character, and on M. Marcellus, a violent aristocrat, and a creature of his own. Cæsar had just effected the destruction of Vercingetorix, and the people had constrained the Senate to decree a Supplication of twenty days in his honor. Nevertheless Marcellus demanded his recall, and was strongly backed by the partisans of the oligar chy. Confident of the support of Pompeius, these men discarded every restraint of justice and moderation. Cæsar had accepted the patronship of the Transpadane Gauls, and had founded a colony at Novum Comum, the modern Como. The Transpadanes had already acquired from Pompeius Strabo the Latin right, which at this time might give almost the consideration as well as the privileges of the Roman franchise. In order to irritate Caesar, Marcel lus had caused a citizen of this Latin colony to be seized on some pretence and beaten with rods. He was not a Roman, indeed, nor had he served, it would seem, a magistracy in his own town, by which he would have acquired the immunities of a Roman. Marcellus may not have violated the express letter of the law, which exempted a Roman citizen from the degradation of the Scourge; nevertheless the Romans themselves acknowledged that it was an indignity to scourge even a Latin, and both Cæsar and his friends in the city resented the act as a studied affront to the popular chieftain.

Pompeius seems to have become conscious that he had evoked a spirit of violence which he was unable to quell. He still hesitated to betake himself to his province, and remained in command of his legions even at the gates of Rome. But he had no intention of making use of them. A spirit of indecision and vacillation crept over him, as on other critical occasions. He visited his villas, shut himself up from the chiefs of his party, while Cato availed himself of his absence to thunder against the Gallic proconsul, and the oligarchs succeeded in removing their most prudent friend from among them by urging upon Cicero the distant government of Cilicia. The orator was unwilling to quit the centre of affairs, the scene of his civic triumphs, on which he still dwelt with unabated complacency. Discarded as he had long been from the councils of his party, and treated, indeed, with unworthy scorn by the loudest brawlers among them, he still clung to the hope that all classes would at last combine to sue for his mediation, and that he should save the state a second time. He was persuaded, how

CHAP. XLIII.

SICKNESS OF POMPEIUS.

341

ever, and yielded. On his arrival in the spring of 51 he found the province menaced by the Parthians, in retaliation for the .c. 703. aggressions of Crassus; but Cassius, who had been left 0.51. in command at the Syrian frontier, had baffled the advance of the enemy, and the new proconsul found no more serious affairs to undertake than the periodical chastisement required by the brigands of the hill districts within his own cantonments. His petty successes in this inglorious warfare earned him the title of imperator, and inspired him with the hope of obtaining a triumph. His civil administration was marked by integrity and moderation, and stood in startling contrast with the tyranny of other proconsuls.

The consul Marcellus was urging Caesar's immediate recall. Pompeius, vacillating and feeble, would now allow him a respite of six months, which, while it irritated him beyond the hope of reconciliation, gave him an interval for preparation. The conduct of Pompeius at this crisis was both treacherous and foolish. Even in the Senate it met with strong opposition. It may be surmised that the veteran statesman was at the moment succumbing to an attack of sickness from which he lay for a time at Neapolis with little hope of recovery. The report, however, of his danger roused the sympathy of the Italians. Their temples were crowded with devotees, sacrifices were offered and vows uttered for his safety; and when his health was declared to be restored, they rushed in crowds to congratulate their ancient favorite as he was slowly transported to Rome. It was a memorable example of the shortsightedness of mortals and the vanity of human wishes. The gods, said the Roman moralists, offered in their divine foreknowledge to remove the great Pompeius at the summit of his fortunes beyond the sphere of human change; but the cities and the nations interposed with prayer, and preserved their hero for defeat and decapitation. But Pompeius himself was not less blind than his admirers. He no longer doubted the extent of his resources and the charm of his great name. There were none to whisper how hollow these demonstrations were; that Italy would surrender without a blow, and the voices now loudest in their devotion would welcome the conqueror of Gaul with no less fervent enthusiasm. "And what," exclaimed Cicero from his distant retreat," are the prospects of a party whose champion falls dangerously sick at least once a year?"

U.O. 704.
B.C. 50.

At the beginning of the year 50 the state of the political game stood thus: The Senate had secured the accession of two consuls of their own party, of whom one, C. Marcellus, a cousin of the late consul, was their devoted ally. The other, Paulus Æmilius, had in fact sold himself to Cæsar for the means of building his splendid basilica. It was arranged that early in

the year the appointment should be made of a successor to Cæsar in Gaul, so that when he came to sue for the consulship he should have relinquished the command of his army, although the prolonged term of his government, if he abstained from such a suit, would not properly expire till the end of 49. On the other hand, the friends of Cæsar could threaten that if their patron were required to surrender his legions, the same should be required of his rival also, and that the illusory proconsulship of Pompeius in Spain. should be brought to a no less speedy termination. Among the new tribunes was also one whose devotion to Cæsar could only be explained to his adversaries by the conviction that he was bought with Gallic gold. C. Scribonius Curio was the son of a senator of high consideration, a firm though temperate adherent of the oligarchy. He had disgraced himself by the licentiousness of his habits; yet he was a youth not only of good parts but of amiable character, and a favorite with Cicero, who, despairing of his own contemporaries, still looked, with a pleasing enthusiasm, to the rising generation for some objects of political hope. But Cæsar found him in the midst of his embarrassments, and offered him present relief and brilliant prospects, by which he was too easily seduced.

The truce accorded to Cæsar had enabled him to crown the conquest of Gaul by the organization of his resources. The Senate was also well furnished with arms. Pompeius maintained seven legions in Spain, which might be transported across the sea if the route of Gaul should be closed against them. But the senators in their sanguine calculations counted on the supposed disaffection of Cæsar's veterans to their commander, and the exhaustion of his resources. Ateius imagined that he could embarrass him by calling for the liquidation of a debt of fifty talents. When Pompeius was asked what he would do if Cæsar persisted in suing for the consulship, and refused to relinquish his command, "What," he replied, "if my son should raise his stick against me?" The two parties were thus pitted against each other when, early in the year 50, the senators opened their batteries. Cæsar's powers, if he should elect to remain in his province, would expire at the close of 49; but C. Marcellus now proposed that he should be recalled from November next ensuing, thus depriving him of a full year of his appointed term. Curio replied with the threat of a countermotion to apply a similar measure to the command of Pompeius. If this resolution were negatived, he was prepared to put his veto on the other. He had concerted with his friends, and was confident of adequate support. His adversary was out-manœuvred, and now resorted to violent language. But the people hailed Curio with acclamations, and matters were evidently hurrying to a crisis.

CHAP. XLIII.

CÆSAR'S ULTIMATUM.

343

Such menaces and retorts could not always explode and pass off innocuously.

Nevertheless, after the consul's first sally of spite and mortification, no preparations were made for the impending struggle. If Marcellus applied to Pompeius, and urged him to concentrate in Italy the legions he commanded in the West, he was checked by the vainglorious confidence of the great warrior's reply: "I have but to stamp with my foot to raise legions in Italy." Thus reassured, the senators decided by a great majority that Cæsar should be recalled, but that his rival should at the same time retain his powers. Curio vehemently remonstrated; the attitude of the people was alarming; the vacillating assembly gave way, and by a majority not less overwhelming than the first demanded the simultaneous resignation of both proconsuls. But the measure was in both cases prospective. Cæsar was collecting his troops from their quarters on the Gallic frontier, and gradually bringing them nearer to the Alps, while he had already stationed himself at Ravenna, on the very borders of Italy. Marcellus, as the year advanced, determined to anticipate the hostile movement which he too clearly foresaw; and seeking Pompeius in his Alban villa, thrust a sword into his hand, and invited him to take the command of all the troops in Italy for the defence of the commonwealth. Cæsar was still strictly within his rights, but the consul and his adherents had forced Pompeius into a position which was actually illegal. Curio felt or pretended that there was no longer any security for himself in the presumed inviolability of his office, and, after protesting against his opponent's call to arms, and proclaiming that the laws had ceased to reign, he suddenly quitted the city as the year was closing, and betook himself to his patron's quarters.

Cæsar had now acquired the excuse which would be sufficient, at least with the people, for striking the blow he meditated. Curio urged him to assume the offensive at once. Nevertheless he allowed his opponents to confirm the impression their violence had already made in his favor. He waited for the commencement of the year, when Q. Cassius and M. Antonius, two devoted partisans, would succeed to the tribunate and insist on the justice of his claims. He empowered Curio to offer his surrender at once of the Transalpine Province, together with the troops which held it, retaining only the Cisalpine and Illyricum, with the moderate force of two legions. This proposal being, as he anticipated, rejected, he would still be content to lay down all his commands if Pompeius would do the same; failing the acceptance of this last condition, he would come in person to Rome, to avenge his own and his country's injuries. Curio, bearing these terms in his hand, was refused a hearing. The consu's, Lentulus and M. Marcellus, pronounced the

state in danger, and the Senate declared that Cæsar should lay down his arms or be treated as a public enemy. Antonius and Cassius interposed their vetoes; the people, they insisted, had granted his term of government-the Senate could not lawfully abridge it. But the Senate, resting upon a principle higher than the law, once more declared the state in danger, and invited the people to invest themselves solemnly in mourning apparel. Pompeius sent some cohorts into the city, while he encamped himself at the gates. The consuls were empowered to act with a high hand, and convened the Senate to determine on the punishment of the refractory tribunes. When it was intimated to them that they would be formally expelled from the assembly, Cassius and Antonius pretended to wrap themselves in disguise, and fled, together with Curio, as if for their lives. In leaving the city they signified that they threw up their outraged office, for the tribune was forbidden to step outside the walls during his term of service. Arrayed in all the dignity of violated independence, they knew that they should be eagerly received at the proconsul's quarters, and paraded through the camp as the cause and justification of war.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Review of the situation.-General tendency of the Roman world towards monarchy.-Cæsar's policy points to the fusion of Rome and her subjects in one nation under a second Alexander.-Cæsar crosses the Rubicon.Pompeius quits Rome for the South of Italy.-Cæsar pursues, and takes many places.-Surrender of Corfinium.-Cæsar's clemency.-Pompeius carries his army across the Adriatic.--Dismay of the senators at his policy.-Cæsar reaches Rome and rifles the temple of Saturn.-Curio defeated and slain in Africa.-Cæsar reduces the province of Spain, and takes Massilia. He is created dictator.--He effects salutary fiscal measures, recalls exiles, and then resigns the office.-Causes himself to be nominated consul with Servilius, and repairs with legitimate powers to his army at Brundisium. (B. C. 49.)

As regards the justification of the revolt against Rome which Cæsar was about to perpetrate, it has been said that the right was technically on his side. He had contrived to throw the crime of actual illegality on his opponents; but the situation was one in which it had become impossible for the lawful government to keep the law, and it was the irregular ambition of Cæsar which had indirectly produced the situation. To the real moving causes of the great civil war we must look deeper than to the personal