the words, though the sense is eternal,' etc., that it (the Veda) is also in part not eternal. By this clause it is implied that the character of the Veda as such is constituted both by the words and by the sense." But is not the order also eternal, since it is a settled doctrine of the modern Mīmānsakas, on the strength of such Vedic texts as this, 'the creator made them as before,' etc., that the order also is the very same? No; this is incorrect, and in consequence, he (Kaiyyața) says, 'in the great dissolutions,' etc. Some say the meaning of this is, that the order is not eternal, inasmuch as it is formed in particular moments. But this is wrong, because it is opposed to the conclusion of the sentence, though their sense is eternal,' etc., and because the objects signified also, such as the jyotishṭoma sacrifice, are not eternal. Others say that both the sense and the order of the words are eternal [or permanent], owing to the continuity of the tradition; and that, consequently, it is in different manvantaras that the order of the words is different, according to the text, in every manvantara this śruti (Veda) is made different.' Others again think that in the words, 'the sense is eternal,' etc., an admission is made by an objector of an eternity opposed to the idea of production, since it is only such a [qualified] eternity that is mentioned in the Veda; and that thus the word 'sense,' or 'object' (arthaḥ), here refers to Isvara, because he is the principal object which is had in view in the whole of the Veda, according to the words of the Bhagavad-gītā (xv. 15), 'It is I whom all the Vedas seek to know.' He next states the proof of the assertion that the order of the letters is not eternal, in the words, 'through the difference of this,' etc. The difference in the order is proved by the difference in the things included under the category of non-eternity. Difference here means variety. But in Iśvara (God), there is no variety. He declares current usage to be the proof of difference, in the words 'Kāṭhaka,' etc., which mean that, though the sense is the same, we use the distinctions of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., in consequence of the difference of arrangement. Here by saying that the order is not eternal, it is implied that the words are the And this is what is asserted in the words [of Kaiyyata], 'consequently Katha and the other sages,"" etc.

same.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for a correction of my former rendering of this sentence, and of several others in this passage of Nāgojibhaṭṭa.

After quoting these passages at greater length than I have given thew, Professor Goldstücker goes on to remark in his note: "I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators, on this important Sutra [of Panini] and its Varttikas, because it is of considerable interest in many respects. . . . . We see Kaiyyața and Nāgojibhaṭṭa writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the Veda with the differences of its various versions, which, nevertheless, maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Patanjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question; and unless it be allowed here to render his expression varna (which means 'letter '), 'word,' it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the Veda. That the modern Mīmānsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense,' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn, amongst others, from Nāgojibhaṭṭa. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mīmānsists, nor by Nagoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaiyyața inform us therefore that, amongst other theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds; and since each manvantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of, the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations, which were 'remembered,' through their 'excessive accomplishments,' by the Rishis, who in this manner produced, or rather reproduced, the texts current in their time, under the name of the versions of the Kathas, Kalapas, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumarila, in his Mīmānsa-vārttika (i. 3, 10).”

III. The Vedanta.-I proceed to adduce the reasonings by which Badarayana, the reputed author of the Brahma, S'ārīraka, or Vedānta Sūtras, as expounded by Sankara Acharyya in his S'ārīraka-mīmām̃sā-bhāshya, or commentary on those Sūtras, defends the eternity and authority of the Veda. His views, as we shall see, are not by any means identical with those of Jaimini and his school. After discussing the question whether any persons but men of the three highest tribes are qualified for divine knowledge, the author of the Sutras comes to the conclusion

that Sūdras, or persons of the fourth tribe, are incompetent, while beings superior to man, the gods, are competent 100 (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 348, or p. 223 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) In Sutra, i. 3, 26, the author determines that the gods have a desire for final emancipation, owing to the transitoriness of their glory, and a capacity for attaining it, because they possess the qualities of corporeality, etc.; and that there is no obstacle which prevents their acquiring divine knowledge. A difficulty, however, having been raised that the gods cannot be corporeal, because, if they were so, it is necessary to conceive that they would be corporeally present (as priests actually are) at the ceremonial of sacrifice, in which they are the objects of worship,-a supposition which would not consist with the usual course of such ceremonies, at which the gods are not seen to be corporeally present, and would, in fact, involve an impossibility, since Indra, for example, being but one, could not be corporeally present at numerous sacrifices at once; this difficulty is solved (under Sūtra i. 3, 27) in two ways, either by supposing (1) that the gods assume different forms, and are present at many sacrifices at once, although invisible to mortals; or by considering (2) that, as a sacrifice is offered to (and not, by) a deity, many persons may present their oblations to that deity at once, just as one Brahman may be saluted by many different persons at the same time. It is, therefore, concluded that the corporeal nature of the gods is not inconsistent with the practice of sacrifice. Having settled these points, Sankara comes to Sūtra i. 3, 28:

"S'abde iti chetna | ataḥ prabhavät | pratyakshānumānābhyām" | Mā nāma vigrahavattve devādīnām abhyupagamyamāne karmani kaśchid virodhaḥ prasanji | śabde tu virodhaḥ prasajyeta | katham | Autpattikam hi sabdasya arthena sambandham āśritya "anapekshatvād" iti vedasya prāmānyam sthāpitam | Idānīm tu vigrahavatī devatā 'bhyupagamyamānā yadyapy aiśvaryya-yogad yugapad aneka-karma-sambandhini havimshi bhunjita tathāpi vigraha-yogad asmad-ādi-vaj janana-maraṇavatī sā iti nityasya śabdasya anityena arthena nitya-sambandhe praliyamāne yad vaidike śabde prāmānyam sthitam tasya virodhaḥ syād iti chet na ayam apy asti virodhaḥ | kasmād “ataḥ prabhavāt" | Ataḥ eva

100 For a discussion of the different question whether the gods can practise the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, see the First Volume of this work, p. 365, note.

hi vaidikāt sabdād devādikam jagat prabhavati | Nanu "janmādi asya yataḥ" (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) iti brahma-prabhavatram jagato 'vadhāritam katham iha śabda-prabhavatvam uchyate | Apicha yadi nāma vaidikāt sabdad asya prabhavo 'bhyupagataḥ katham etāvatā virodhaḥ śabde parihṛitaḥ | yāvatā Vasavo Rudrāḥ Ādityāḥ Viśvedevāḥ Marutaḥ ity ete 'rthaḥ anityāḥ eva utpattimatṭvāt | Tad-anityatve cha tad-vachakānaṁ vaidikānām Vasv-ādi-śabdānām anityatvam kena vāryyate | Prasiddham hi loke Devadattasya putre utpanne Yajnadattaḥ iti tasya nāma kriyate iti | Tasmad virodhaḥ eva sabde iti chet | na | Gavādi-śabdārtha-sambandhanityatva-darśanāt | Na hi gavādi-vyaktīnām utpattimattve tad-ākṛitīnām apy utpattimattvam syād dravya-guna-karmanām hi vyaktayaḥ eva utpadyante na ākṛitayaḥ | Ākṛitibhiś cha śabdānāṁ sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ | vyaktīnām ānantyāt sambandha-grahaṇānupapatteḥ | Vyaktishu utpadyamānāsv apy ākṛitīnām nityatvād na gavādi-śabdeshu kaśchid virodho driśyate | Tathā devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagame 'pi ākṛiti-nityatvād na kaśchid Vasv-ādi-śabdeshu virodhaḥ iti drashṭavyam | Ākṛiti-viśeshas tu devādīnām mantrārthavādādibhyo vigrahavatṭvādy-avagamād avagantavyaḥ | Sthana-visesha-sambandha-nimittäś cha Indrādi - śabdāḥ senāpatyādisabda-vat | Tataś cha yo yas tat tat sthānam adhitishṭhati sa sa Indrādisabdair abhidhiyate iti na dosho bhavati | Na cha idam sabda-prabhavatvam Brahma-prabhavatva-vad upādāna-kāraṇatvābhiprāyena uchyate | katham tarhi sthiti-vāchakātmanā nitye śabde nityūrtha-sambandhini sabda-vyavāhāra-yogyārtha-vyakti-nishpattir "ataḥ prabhavaḥ" ity uchyate | katham punar avagamyate śabdāt prabhavati jagad iti | “pratyakshānumānābhyām" | Pratyaksham śrutiḥ | prāmānyam prati anapekshatvāt | anumānam smṛitiḥ | prāmāṇjam prati sāpekshatrāt | Te hi śabda-pūrvām sṛishtim darśayataḥ | "Ete" iti vai prajāpatir devān asrijata "asrigram" iti manushyān "indavaḥ" iti pitṛīms "tiraḥ pavitram iti grahān “āśavaḥ” iti stotram “viśvāni” iti śastram “abhi saubhagā” ity anyāḥ prajāḥ iti śrutiḥ | Tathā 'nyatrāpi “sa manasā vācham mithunam samabhavad" (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa x. 6, 5, 4, and Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, p. 50) ityādinā tatra tatra śabda-pūrvikā srishtiḥ śravyate | Smritir api "anadi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛishṭā svayambhuva | adau vedamayi divya yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛittayaḥ" ity utsargo'py ayam vāchaḥ sampradaya-pravarttanātmako drashṭavyaḥ anādi-nidhanāyāḥ anyādṛiśasya utsargasya asambhavāt | Tathā “nāma rūpam̃ cha bhūtānām karmanām cha pravarttanam | Veda-sabdebhya evadau nirmame sa

maheśvaraḥ" iti "sarvesham cha sa nāmāni karmāni cha prithak prithak | Veda-sabdebhya evādau pṛithak samsthāś cha nirmame" iti cha | Apicha chikirshitam artham anutishthan tasya vāchakam śabdam pūrvam smṛitvā paschāt tam artham anutishṭhati iti sarveshām naḥ pratyaksham etat | Tathā prajapater api srashṭuḥ sṛishteḥ pūrvam vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ manasi prādurbabhūvuḥ paśchāt tad-anugatān arthān sasarjja iti gamyate | Tathā cha śrutiḥ "sa bhūr iti vyāharan bhūmim asṛijata' "101 ity-evam-ādikā bhūr-ādi-śabdebhyaḥ eva manasi prūdurbhūtebhyo bhūr-ādi-lokān prādurbhūtān sṛishṭān darśayati | kim-atmakam punaḥ śabdam abhipretya idam, sabda-prabhavatvam uchyate | sphoṭam ity aha | . . . . Tasmād nityāt | āha sabdāt sphoṭa-rupād abhidhāyakāt kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakshanam jagad abhidheya-bhūtam prabhavatīti | . . . . Tataś cha nityebhyaḥ śabdebhyo devādi-vyaktīnām prabhavaḥ ity aviruddham |

....

Sūtra i. 3, 29. "Ata eva cha nityatvam" | svatantrasya karttuḥ smaranād eva hi sthite vedasya nityatve devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagamena tasya virodham āśankya “ataḥ prabhavād” iti parihṛitya idānīm tad eva veda-nityatvam sthitam draḍhayati "ata eva cha nityatvam" iti | ataḥ eva cha niyatākṛiter devūder jagato veda-sabda-prabhavatvād eva vedasabda-nityatvam api pratyetavyam | Tathā cha mantra-varnaḥ "yajnena vāchaḥ padaviyam āyan tām anvavindann rishishu pravishṭām" iti sthitām eva vācham anuvinnām darśayati | Vedavyāsaś cha evam eva smarati (Mahābhārata, Vanap. 7660) | "yugānte 'ntarhitān vedān setihāsān maharshayaḥ | lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujnātāḥ svayambhuvā” iti |

"Sūtra i. 3, 28: 'But it is said that there will be a contradiction in respect of sound (or the word); but this is not so, because the gods are produced from it, as is proved by intuition and inference.'

"Be it so, that though the corporeality of the gods, etc., be admitted, no contradiction will arise in respect of the ceremonial. Still [it will be said that] a contradiction will arise in regard to the word. How? [In this way.] By founding upon the inherent connection of a word with the thing signified, the authority of the Veda had been established by the aphorism 'anapekshatvāt,' etc. (Mīmānsā Sūtras i 2, 21; see above, p. 75.) But now, while it has been admitted that the deities are corporeal, it will follow that (though from their possession of divine power they can at one and the same time partake of the oblations

101 Compare S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 1, 6, 3.