the blind man and the bull's tail, 143 and would fail of attaining to soul which was quite different from it; and would in consequence lose the object of its efforts, and suffer injury. It is therefore proper to conclude that just as the Vedic precept, that he who desires paradise should perform the agnihotra sacrifice is conformable to truth, so, too, the text which says to the man seeking after emancipation, this is soul, thou art that, o Svetaketu,' declares to him soul in conformity with the reality. And so,—as in the case of the man (charged with theft) who takes into his hand the red-hot axe, and (in consequence of the truth of his protestation of innocence) is delivered (Chh. Up. vi. 16, 2),-the promise of final emancipation will hold good in the case of the man whose thoughts are fixed on the true Brahma. . . . Consequently the application of the word 'soul' to the existent subtile thing' is not figurative. Whereas (i) the use of the same word when applied to a servant (as when it is said 'Bhadrasena is my soul'), is shown to be figurative by the manifest distinctness of a servant from his master. And the fact that a word is sometimes observed to be employed figuratively does not justify the supposition that it is so used in cases where the (proper) sense is established by the words; because that would give rise to doubt in every instance. Again, (j) it is incorrect to say that the word soul is common to things conscious and unconscious, (as the term jyotis means both sacrifice and flame), because the assertion that it has a variety of significa 143 The story or fable here alluded to is told at length by Ananda Giri, and more briefly by Govinda Ananda as follows: Kaśchit kila dushṭātmā mahāranya-mārge patilam andham sva-bandhu-nagaram jigamishum babhāshe “kim attra āyushmatā duḥkhitena sthiyate" iti | sa cha andhaḥ sukha-vānīm ākarnya tam āptam matvā uvācha "aho mad-bhāgadheyam yad attra bhavān mām dīnam svābhishṭa-nagaraprāpty-asamartham bhāshate” iti | sa cha vipralipsur dushṭa-go-yuvānam ānīya tadiya-langulam andham grāhayāmāsa upadideśa cha enam andham "esha go-yuvā trām nagaram neshyati mā tyaja lāngūlam" iti sa cha andhaḥ śraddhālutayā tad atyajan svābhīshṭam aprāpya anartha-paramparām prāptas tena nyāyena ity arthaḥ | "A certain malicious person said to a blind man who was lying on the road through a forest, and wishing to proceed to the city of his friends, Why, distressed old man, do you stay here?' The blind man hearing the agreeable voice of the speaker, and regarding him as trustworthy, replied: 'O how great is my good fortune that you have accosted me who am helpless, and unable to go to the city which I desire to reach!' The other, wishing to deceive him, brought a vicious young bull, and made the blind man lay hold of his tail, and told him that the young bull would conduct him to the city, enjoining him not to let go the tail. Trusting to the speaker, the blind kept his hold, but did not attain the object of his desire, and encountered a series of mishaps;-such is the illustration." tions is unreasonable. Hence the word soul, which properly refers to conscious things, is applied to the elements, etc., by a figurative ascription to them of consciousness, as when we say, 'the soul of the elements,' or 'the soul of the bodily organs.' And even if it were admitted that the word soul was common to different things, it could not be ascertained whether it had reference to one thing or another unless the context or some auxiliary word determined the point. But in the case before us there is nothing to determine that it denotes anything unconscious; on the contrary, the subject of the sentence is the Existent, the beholder,' and in immediate connection with it is the conscious Svetaketu; for as we have already said an unconscious thing cannot be conceived as the soul of the conscious Svetaketu. Thus it is settled that the word 'soul' refers to a conscious being," etc. In the fourth section ( pāda) of the 1st Book, the author of the Sūtras returns to his controversy with the Sankhyas, and Sankara, after alluding to the aphorisms in which they had previously been combated, proceeds as follows (p. 334): Idam tv idānim avasishṭam āśankyate | yad uktam pradhānasya aśabdatvam tad asiddham käsuchit śākhāsu pradhāna-samarpanābhāṣānām śabdānam śrūyamāṇatvāt | ataḥ pradhānasya kāraṇatvam veda-prasiddham eva mahadbhiḥ paramarshibhih Kapilädibhiḥ parigrihitam iti prasajyate | tad yavat teshām sabdānām anya-paratvam na pratipadyate tāvat sarvajnam Brahma jagataḥ kāranam iti pratipāditam apy ākulībhavet | atas teshām anya-paratvam darśayitum paraḥ sandarbhaḥ pravarttate | "ānumānikam api" (Br. Sūtra i. 4, 1) anumāna-nirūpitam api pradhānam "ekeshām” śākhinām śabdavad upalabhyate | Kāṭhake hi pathyate "mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt purushaḥ paraḥ” iti | tattra ye eva yan-nāmāno yat-kramakāś cha mahad-avyakta-purushāḥ smriti-prasiddhās te eva iha pratyabhijnāyante | tattra “avyaktam” iti smriti-prasiddheḥ śabdādi-hīnatvāch cha na vyaktam avyaktam iti vyutpatti-sambhavat smriti-prasiddham pradhānam abhidhiyate | atas tasya sabdavatträd aśabdatvam anupapannam 14 | tad eva cha jagataḥ kāraṇam śruti-smriti-prasiddhibhyaḥ iti chet | na etad evam | na hy etat Kāṭhakavākyam smriti-prasiddhayor mahad-avyaktayor astitva-param | na hy attra yādṛiśam smṛiti-prasiddham svatantram kāranam triguṇam pradhānaṁ 144 The text given in the Bibl. Indica has upapannam, but I follow the old edition in Bengali characters in reading anupapannam, which seems required by the sense. tādṛiśam pratyabhijnāyate | śabda-māttram hy attra avyaktam iti pratyabhijnāyate | sa cha sabdo na vyaktam avyaktam iti yaugikatrād anyasminn api sūkshme durlakshye cha prayujyate na cha ayam kasminśchid rudhaḥ | yā tu pradhāna -vādinām rūḍhiḥ sā teshām eva pāribhāshiki sati na vedūrtha-nirūpane kārana-bhāvam pratipadyate | na cha krama-māttra-sāmarthyāt samānārtha-pratipattir bhavaty asati tad-rupa - pratyabhijnāne | na hy aśva-sthāne gām paśyann aśvo 'yam ity amūḍho 'dhyavasyati | prakaraṇa-nirūpaṇāyāṁ cha attra na paraparikalpitam pradhanam pratiyate sarira - rūpaka - vinyasta - grihiteḥ | sariram hy attra ratha-rupaka-vinyastam avyakta-śabdena parigrihyate | kutaḥ prakaranāt pariseshach cha | tatha hy anantarātīto granthaḥ ātma-śarīrādīnām rathi-rathādi-rūpaka-klṛiptim darśayati | (Katha Upanishad, i. 3, 3 f.) “ātmānam̃ rathinam viddhi śarīram ratham eva cha | buddhim cha sārathiṁ viddhi manaḥ pragraham eva cha | 4. Indriyāni hayān āhur vishayāms teshu gocharān | ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhoktety āhur manīshinaḥ" | taiś chaindriyādibhir asamyataiḥ samsāram adhigachchhati | samyatais tv adhvanaḥ pāram tad Vishnoḥ paramam padam āpnoti iti darśayitvā kim tad adhvanaḥ pāram Vishnoḥ paramam padam ity asya ākānkshāyāṁ tebhyaḥ eva prakṛitebhyaḥ indriyādibhyaḥ paratvena paramātmānam adhvanaḥ pāram tad Vishnoḥ paramam padam darśayati | Katha Up. i. 3, 10 f.) "indriyebhyaḥ parāḥ hy arthūḥ arthebhyaś cha param manaḥ | manasas tu parā buddhir buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ | 11. Mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt purushaḥ paraḥ | purushād na param kinchit sā kāshṭhā sā parā gatir” iti | . . . . "Buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ" yaḥ sa "ātmānam rathinam viddhi” iti rathitvena upakshiptaḥ | kutaḥ | ātma-śabdād bhoktuś cha bhogopakaranāt paratvopapatteḥ | mahattvam cha asya svāmitvād upapannam | · yā prathamajasya Hiranyagarbhasya buddhiḥ sā sarvāsām buddhīnām paramā pratishṭhā sā iha "mahận ātmā" ity uchyate | sa cha pūrvattra buddhigrahanena eva gṛihītā satī hirug iha upadiśyate tasyāḥ apy asmadīyābhyo buddhibhyaḥ paratvoupapatteḥ . . . . tad evam sariram eva ekam pariśishyate | teshu 145 itarāni indriyādīni prakṛitāny eva parama-padadidarśayishayā samanukrāman pariśishyamānena iha anena avyakta-śabdena parisishyamānam prakṛitam śarīram darśayati iti gamyate | tad evam pūrvāparālochanāyām nāsty attra para-parikalpitasya pradhānasya avakāśaḥ | 2. “Sūksham tu tad-arhatvāt” | uktam etat prakaraṇa145 The earlier edition above referred to omits teshu. | pariseshābhyām sarīram avyakta-śabdam na pradhānam iti | idam idānīm āśankyate katham avyakta - śabdārhatvaṁ śarīrasya yāvatā sthūlatvāt spashṭataram idam sariram vyakta-śabdārham aspashṭa-vachanas tv avyakta - sabdaḥ iti | ataḥ uttaram uchyate | sūksham tv iha kāranātmanā śarīram vivakshyate sūkshmasya avyakta-śabdārhatvāt | yady-` api sthulam idam śarīram na svayam avyakta-śabdam arhati tathāpi tasya tv ārambhakam bhūta - sūksham avyakta - śabdam arhati | attra aha yadi jagad idam anabhivyakta - nāma - rūpaṁ vījātmakam prāg-avastham avyakta - śabdārham abhyupagamyeta tad-atmanā cha śarīrasyāpy avyakta-śabdārhatvam pratijnāyeta sa eva tarhi pradhānakāraṇa - vādaḥ evam saty āpadyeta asya eva jagataḥ prāg - avasthāyāḥ pradhānatvena abhyupagamad iti | attra uchyate | yadi vayam svatantrām kanchit prāg-avasthām jagataḥ kāranatvena abhyupagachchema prasanjayema tadā pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādam | Parmeśvarādhīņā tv iyam asmābhiḥ prāg-avasthā jagato 'bhyupagamyate na svatantrā | sā cha avaśyam abhyupagantavya | arthavatī hi sā | na hi tayā vinā Parameśvarasya srashtṛitvam siddhyati śakti-rahitasya tasya pravṛitty-anupapatteḥ muktānām cha punar-utpattir vidyayā tasyāḥ vīja-śakter dāhāt | avidyātmikā hi sa vija-saktir avyakta - śabda -nirdeśya Paramesvarāśrayā māyāmayi mahāsushuptir yasyām svarūpa - pratibodha - rahitaḥ śerate samsarino jivāḥ | tad etad avyaktam kvachid ākāśa-śabda-nirdishṭam | "etasmin nu khalv akshare Gārgi ākāśaḥ otaś cha protaś cha" iti śruteḥ | kvachid akshara-sabdoditam "āksharāt parataḥ paraḥ" iti śruteḥ | kvachid māyā iti sūchitam “māyāṁ tu prakṛitiṁ vidyād māyinam tu maheśvaram” iti mantra-varṇāt | avyaktā hi sā māyā tatṭvānyatva-nirūpanasya aśakyatvāt | tad idam "mahataḥ param avyaktam" ity uktam avyakta-prabhavatvād mahato yadā Hairanyagarbhi buddhir mahān | yadā tu jīvo mahāms tadā 'py avyaktādhīnatvāj jīva-bhāvasya mahataḥ param avyaktam ity uktam | avidyā hy avyaktam avidyāvattve cha jīvasya sarvaḥ samvyavahāraḥ santato varttate | tach cha avyakta-gatam mahataḥ paratvam abhedopachārāt tad-vikāre śarīre parikalpyate | "But now this doubt still remains. The assertion that the existence of Pradhana is not supported by the Veda is, say the Sankhyas, destitute of proof, as certain Vedic Sākhās contain passages which have the appearance of affirming Pradhāna. Consequently the causality of Pradhāna has been received by Kapila and other great rishis on the ground that it is established by the Veda; and this is an objection to the state ment which you make to the contrary. Until, therefore, it be established that these passages have a different object, the doctrine that an omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, even though it has been proved, will be again unsettled; and consequently you bring forward a great array of arguments to shew that these texts apply to something else. In the words 'it may be deduced also,' i.e. it is determined by inference, it is shewn that in the opinion of certain schools the doctrine of Pradhana is scriptural, for in the Katha Upanishad (i. 3, 11) we read the words 'Above the Great one is Avyakta (the Unmanifested one), and above the Unmanifested one is Purusha (Soul).' Here we recognize 'the Great one,' 'the Unmanifested one,' and Purusha, with the same names and in the same order in which they are known to occur in the Smriti (.e. the system of Kapila). Here that which is called Pradhana in the Smriti is denoted by the word 'the Unmanifested one,' as we learn both from its being so called in the Smriti, and from the epithet 'unmanifested' (which is derived from the words 'not' and 'manifested') being properly applicable to it in consequence of its being devoid of sound, and the other objects of sense: wherefore, from its having this Vedic authority to support it, its (i.e. Pradhana's) unscriptural character is refuted; and it is proved both by the Veda, the Smriti, and common notoriety to be the cause of the world. If the Sankhyas argue thus, we reply that the case is not so; for this text of the Katha Upanishad does not refer to the existence of the Great one' and the 'Unmanifested one,' which are defined in the Smriti (of Kapila); for here we do not recognize such a self-dependent cause, viz. Pradhana, composed of the three qualities, as is declared in that Smriti, but the mere epithet 'unmanifested.' And this word 'unmanifested,' owing to its sense as a derivative from the words 'not' and 'manifested,' is also applied to anything else which is subtile or indistinguishable, and has not properly a conventional meaning in reference to any particular thing. As for the conventional use which the assertors of Pradhana make of it, that is a technical application peculiar to themselves, and does not afford any means for determining the sense of the Vedas. Nor does the mere identity of the order (of the three words) furnish any proof of identity of meaning unless we can recognise the essential character of the things to be the same. For no man but a fool, if he saw a cow in the place where he expected to see a horse, would falsely |