sessing the attributes of the principle of Intellect (Mahat). Or, in accordance with the idea of becoming multiplied, the expression (indicating consciousness and will) is figuratively applied to Pradhana, as when it is said of the bank of a river that it intends to fall.' For on any other supposition the incapability of any modification which is ascribed to Purusha in such texts as 'He who is the witness, the conscious, the sole being, free from the Qualities,' could not properly be applied to him (since if he were the material cause of the creation he must become modified). And it has been before explained 152 that this denial of an Īśvara is a mere display of ingenuity, introduced for the purpose of producing apathy in regard to glory, and of propounding a method of final liberation even independently of the knowledge of an Ïśvara.”

The following is the 34th Sutra of the sixth Book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:

Nanu "bahviḥ prajāḥ purushāt samprasūtaḥ" ity-ādi-śruteḥ purushasya kāraṇatvāvagamād vivarttādi - vādāḥ āśrayanīyāḥ ity āśankya aha | "śruti-virodhad na kutarkāpasadasya ātma-lābhaḥ" | purushakāraṇatāyām ye ye pakshaḥ sambhāvitās te sarve śruti-viruddhāḥ iti | atas tad-abhyupagantṛīnām kutārkikādy - adhamānām ātma - svarūpajnānam na bhavati ity arthaḥ | etena ātmani sukha-duḥkhādi-gunopādānatva-vadino 'pi kutärkikäḥ eva tesham apy atma-yathärtha-jnānam nasti ity avagantavyam | atma-kāranatā-śrutayaś cha sakti-saktimadabhedena upāsanārṭhāḥ eva “ajām ekām" ity-ādi-śrutibhiḥ pradhānakāranatā-siddheḥ | yadi cha ākāśasya abhrādy-adhishṭhāna-kāraṇatā-vad ātmanaḥ kāraṇatvam uchyate tadā tad na nirākurmaḥ parināmasya pratishedhat |

"But must we not adopt the theories of an illusory creation, etc., because the causality of Purusha (soul) is to be learned from such texts as the following 'many creatures have been produced from Purusha?' To this difficulty he replies: "From his opposition to Scripture the illogical outcaste does not attain to Soul.' The sense of this is, that all the propositions, affirming the causality of Soul, which have been devised, are contrary to the Veda; and consequently the low class of bad logicians, etc., who adopt them have no knowledge of the nature of

152 See Vijnana Bhikshu's remarks, introductory to the Sūtras (p. 5, at the foot), which will be quoted in the next Section, and his comment on Sutra i. 92. He is, as we shall find, an eclectic, and not a thorough-going adherent of the Sänkhya.

Soul.

99153

Hence it is to be understood that those also who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities of pleasure and pain, etc., are incompetent reasoners: they too are destitute of the true knowledge of Soul. The Vedic texts which declare its causality are intended to inculcate devotion on the ground that there is no distinction between Power (S'akti) and the possessor of Power (S'aktimat); for the causality of Pradhana is established by such texts as that relating to the 'one unborn female,' etc. But if it be affirmed that Soul is the cause of the world merely in the same sense in which the æther is the cause of clouds, etc., viz. by affording them a receptacle, we do not object to that, since we only deny the transformation (of Soul into material productions).' In regard to the question whether the principles of the Vedanta or those of the Sankhya are most in harmony with the most prevalent doctrine of the Upanishads, I shall quote some of the remarks of Dr. Röer, the translator of many of these treatises. In his introduction to the Taittiriya Upanishad he observes that we there find "the tenets peculiar to the Vedanta already in a far advanced state of development; it contains as in a germ the principal elements of this system." "There are, however," he adds, "differences " (Bibliotheca Indica, vol. xv. p. 5). The same nearly is the case with the Aitareya Upanishad (ibid. p. 27). In reference to the Svetasvatara Upanishad he remarks: "Sankara in his commentary on this Upanishad generally explains its fundamental views in the spirit of the Vedanta. He is sometimes evidently wrong in identifying the views of some of the other Upanishads with the tenets of the Vedanta, but he is perfectly right to do so in the explanation of an Upanishad which appears to have been composed for the express purpose of making the principle of the Vedanta agreeable to the followers of the Sankhya" (ibid. pp. 43 f.). Of the Katha Upanishad Dr. Röer says (ibid. p. 97): "The standing point of the Katha is on the whole that of the Vedanta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world. . . . . In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by the other Upanishads and by the later Vedanta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sankhya. The order is here: The unmanifested (avyakta), the great soul (mahātma, or mahat), intellect

...

153 See Dr. Ballantyne's translation, which I have often followed. He does not, however, render in extenso all the passages which I have reproduced.

(buddhi), mind, the objects of the senses, and the senses," etc. 154 The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further may consult the same author's remarks on the other Upanishads. On the whole question of the relation of the Vedanta and the Sankhya respectively to the Veda, Dr. Röer thus expresses himself in his introduction to the Svetasvatara Upanishad (p. 36): "The Vedanta, although in many important points deviating from the Vedas, and although in its own doctrine quite independent of them, was yet believed to be in perfect accordance with them, and being adopted by the majority of the Brahmans, it was never attacked on account of its orthodoxy. The same cannot be said of the Sankhya; for it was not only frequently in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedas, but sometimes openly declared so. Indeed, the Vedanta also maintained that the acquisition of truth is independent of caste (1) or any other distinction, and that the highest knowledge which is the chief end of man cannot be imparted by the Vedas (vide Katha ii. 23); yet it insisted that a knowledge of the Vedas was necessary to prepare the mind for the highest knowledge (2). This the Sankhya denied altogether, and although it referred to the Vedas, and especially to the Upanishads, still it did so only when they accorded with its own doctrines, and it rejected their authority (3) in a case of discrepancy."

I make a few remarks on some points in this quotation indicated by the figures (1), (2), and (3). (1) We have already learned above, p. 99, that, according to the Brahma Sutras (see i. 3, 34 ff., and Sankara's explanation of them), at least, a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge. (2) It appears from Sankara's argument against Jaimini that he does not consider a knowledge of the ceremonial part of the Veda as necessary for the acquisition of divine knowledge, but he seems to regard the Upanishads as the source from which the latter is derived. (3) I do not know on what authority this statement that the Sankhyas ever actually rejected the authority of the Vedas is founded. Their attempts to reconcile their tenets with the letter of the Veda may often seem to be far-fetched and sophistical; but I have not observed that Sankara, while arguing elaborately against the interpretations of the Sankhyas, anywhere charges them either with denying the authority of the Veda, or with insincerity in the appeals which they make to the sacred texts.

154 See above, p. 161.

On the subject of the Upanishads the reader may also consult Prof. Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

155

I subjoin in a note some extracts from this work. 15

The Nyaya and Vaiseshika Sūtras do not appear to contain nearly so many references to Vedic texts as the Sankhya; but I have noticed the following: Nyaya iii. 32 (= iii. 1, 29 in the Bibl. Ind.); Vaiśeshika ii. 1, 17; iii. 2, 21; iv. 2, 11; v. 2, 10.

The author of the Vaiseshika Sūtras affirms, in iii. 2, 20, the doctrine that souls are numerous; and in the 21st Sutra, which I quote, along with the comment of Sankara Miśra, and the gloss of the editor Pandit Jayanarayana Tarkapanchanana, he claims Vedic authority for this tenet: 21. “S'āstra-sāmarthyāch cha" | (Sankara Miśrā) S'āstram srutiḥ |

155"They (the Upanishads) contain, or are supposed to contain, the highest authority on which the various systems of philosophy in India rest. Not only the Vedanta philosopher, who, by his very name, professes his faith in the ends and objects of the Veda, but the Sankhya, the Vai eshika, the Nyāya, and Yoga philosophers, all pretend to find in the Upanishads some warranty for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India. Their founders, if they have any pretensions to orthodoxy, invariably appeal to some passage in the Upanishads in order to substantiate their own reasonings. Now it is true that in the Upanishads themselves there is so much freedom and breadth of thought that it is not difficult to find in them some authority for almost any shade of philosophical opinion." (p. 316 f.) Again: "The early Hindus did not find any difficulty in reconciling the most different and sometimes contradictory opinions in their search after truth; and a most extraordinary medley of oracular sayings might be collected from the Upanishads, even from those which are genuine and comparatively ancient, all tending to elucidate the darkest points of philosophy and religion, the creation of the world, the nature of God, the relation of man to God, and similar subjects. That one statement should be contradicted by another seems never to have been felt as any serious difficulty." (p. 320 f.) Once more: "The principal interest of the older Upanishads consists in the absence of that systematic uniformity which we find in the later systems of philosophy; and it is to be regretted that nearly all the scholars who have translated portions of the Upanishads have allowed themselves to be guided by the Brahmanic commentators," etc. (p. 322). "In philosophical discussions, they (the Brahmans) allowed the greatest possible freedom; and although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmānsas and the Nyaya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiseshika, Sānkhya, and Yoga schools. The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance." (p. 78 f.)

tayā 'py ātmano bheda-pratipādanāt | śruyate hi.... (Jayanārāyaṇa) ito 'py jivasya isvara-bhinnatvam ity āha | śāstrasya śruteḥ śāmarthyāj jivesvarayor bheda-bodhakatvāt | tatha hi | "dve brahmani veditavye" (Maitri Up. vi. 22) | “dvā suparnā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛiksham parishasvajate | tayor anyaḥ pippalam svādu atti anaśnann anyo abhichākasīti" (Rig-veda Sanhitā, i. 164, 20; Svetāśv. Up. vi. 6; Munḍaka Up. i. 3, 1, 1) ity-ādi-śruter jīvesvarayor bhedo 'vasyam angīkāryyaḥ | na cha "tat tvam asi Svetaketo" "Brahma-vid Brahma eva bhavati" ity-ādi-śrutīnām kā gatir iti vachyam | "tat tvam asi" iti śrutes tadabhedena tadīyatva-pratipādanena abheda-bhāvanā-paratvāt | “Brahmavid Brahma eva" iti śrutis cha nirduḥkhatvādinā Īśvara-sāmyam jīvasya abhidhatte na tu tad-abhedam | "niranjanaḥ param samyam upaiti" iti śruter gaty-antarāsambhavāt | asti hi laukika-vākyeshu “sampad-ādhikye purohito 'yam rājā sam̃vṛittaḥ” ity-ādishu sādṛiśya-pareshv abhedopachāraḥ na cha moksha-daśāyām ajnāna-nivṛittāv abhedo jāyate iti vāchyam bhedasya nityatvena nāśāyogād bheda-nāśāngīkāre 'pi vyaktidvayavasthanasya avaśyakatvāch cha iti sankshepaḥ | bheda-sādhakāni yukty-antarāni śruty-antarāni cha grantha-gaurava-bhiyā parityaktāni |

"And this opinion is confirmed by the Sastra.' (Sankara Miśra) The Sastra means the Veda; by which also a distinction of Souls is established. For it is said," etc. [He then quotes two texts which are repeated by Jayanārāyaṇa, the author of the gloss, whose remarks are as follows:] "There is another proof of the Soul being distinct from Isvara; viz. this, that it is confirmed by the Sastra, the Veda, which declares the distinctness of the two; and this principle must of necessity be admitted from such texts as these: 'Two Brăhmăs are to be known; '156 and 'Two birds, united, friends, attach themselves to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruit of the pippala tree, while the other, without eating, looks on.' Nor are we to ask what will then become of such other texts as (1) 'Thou art that, o Svetaketu;' (2) 'He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma;' for the former of these two passages (1) tends to convey the idea of identity by representing as identity with That, the fact of Svetaketu's entirely belonging to That; whilst

156 The full text is: Dve brahmanī veditavye śabda-brahma param cha yat—sabdabrahmani nishṇātaḥ param brahmādhigachhati | “Two Brăhmås are to be known, the verbal and the supreme. He who is initiated in the former attains the latter." Here, however, by the verbal Brǎhmă, the Veda must be intended.