Supplementary Note on Kālātyayāpadishṭa.-See page 84, note 89, and page 290.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for the following additional remarks on this expression:

The Tarkasangraha, quoted by Professor Cowell in his interesting note which you kindly communicated to me, differs materially from the Bhashāparichchheda in its interpretation of the fallacy called by them badha; and I might add that the Tarkasangraha-dīpikāprakāśa offers even a third explanation of the same Vaiśeshika term. But I do not think that the badha of the Vaiseshikas is the same as the kālātīta of the Naiyayikas. For when we find that the Bhāshāparichchheda in its enumeration at v. 70 applies to the fifth hetvābhāsa the epithet kālātyayopadishṭa (probably the same as the kālātyayāpadishṭa of the Nyaya-sūtra i. 50) yet in its explanation of v. 77 does not call it kālātīta, as the Nyaya does, but badha, such a variation in terms seems pointed; and when we find moreover that its interpretation of badha differs from Vätsyāyana's interpretation of kälätita, there seems to be a still greater probability that the Nyaya and Vaiseshika disagree on the question of the fifth hetvābhāsa.

For that there is no real difference between the Nyayabhashya and the Nyayavritti is still my opinion. Both commentaries, I hold, agree in stating that the fallacy kālātīta arises when a reason assigned exceeds its proper sphere (sādhanakāla), and neither, I think, can have taken kāla in its literal sense of "time." This might have been the case if, as Professor Cowell seems to suggest, "plausibility" of an argument were the subject of the Sūtra; but as, in my opinion, the hetu is always intended to be a valid and good hetu, I do not see how such a hetu can become a bad one simply by being advanced too late. It would, however, become bad by being applied to a time, i.e. to a case to which it properly does not belong.

The circumstance that the Vritti and Bhashāparichchheda are probably works of the same author, does not invalidate my opinion; it would seem on the contrary to confirm it, since the object of both these works is a different one: the former being intended as an exposition of the Nyaya, and the latter as one of the Vaiseshika.

INDEX TO PRINCIPAL NAMES AND MATTERS.