which ostensibly satisfy but in fact pervert the principles
established by the Court in In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
In that case an attorney was disciplined for offering free
legal assistance to a prospective client on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union. The Supreme Court held,
however, that in so acting she enjoyed First and Fourteenth
Amendment protections because "her actions were undertaken to
express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil
liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive fi-
nancial gain" either for the organization or for herself, id.
at 422, 426-32, and implicated no evils of solicitation which
the state had a right to prevent, id. at 426.
attorneys, then, may try to operate under the guise of a non-
profit association. Although the Court warned that "sham"
arrangements would not be protected, id. at 428 n. 20, it is
up to the bar and labor to be vigilant here. But cf. Inter-
national Union, UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (non-
profit legal organization financed in part by employers not
subject to LMRDA reporting requirements; fund is not controlled
by employers and operates as "buffer" between interests of
employer and those of employee clients).

Union-busting

285/ Meyer Stamping & Manufacturing Co., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1322, 99 L.R.R.M. 1205 (1978); Plastic Film Products Corp., 238

N.L.R.B. No. 22, 99 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1978).

286/

287/

288/

Indiana v. Blankenship, CR No. 4 (Marion Super. Ct., Crim.
Div., filed January 18, 1980). Blankenship is the plaintiff
in another action, suing a different Indiana company for the
unpaid part of a fee allegedly due him under a contract for
his services to "unseat and decertify" the union representing
the company's employees, Blankenship v. Mark Twain Marine.
An NLRB Administrative Law Judge recently found that
Blankenship's decertification efforts on Mark Twain Marine's
behalf violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, Mark
Twain Marine Industries, Inc., Case No. 14-12254 (June 30, 1980).

Statements or entries generally

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully falsifies, con-
ceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or de-
vice a material fact, or makes any false, ficti-
tious or fraudulent statements or representations,
or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisioned not more than
five years, or both.

See, e.g., United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.
1975) (false unsworn response by union official during NLRB
fact-finding hearing following petition for election). See
also Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) (false non-
Communist affidavit filed by union officer under later-
repealed provision of National Labor Relations Act); Sells
v. United States, 262 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 913 (1959) (false non-Communist affidavit filed by

289/ 290/

union officer).

Section 1001 also reaches by its terms statements made to the Department of Labor, but $209 of the LMRDA already provides for prosecution and penalties for false statements and for nondisclosure of material facts, see notes 172-73 and accompanying text supra. United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287 (1976). A statement is covered whether it is written, oral, sworn, or unsworn, United States v. Krause, supra at 117; whether or not it is required by law to be made, United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F.Supp. 1120, 1130 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); and regardless of the context or proceeding so long as the statement "substantially impair [s] the basic functions entrusted by law" to the agency, United States v. Krause, supra at 117-18. An example is misrepresenting facts to an investigator where they are peculiarly within the declarant's knowledge, id. at 118. Thus consultant statements to Board agents during unfair labor practice investigations are reachable. teriality" requires only a tendency or capability to influence a tribunal's decision, United States v. Voorhees, 593 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979), and no actual loss or damage to the government need result, United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966). "Agency jurisdiction" has been found to include the investigatory as well as adjudicatory stages, United States v. Krause, supra at 117.

"Ma

291/
Note 275 and accompanying text supra.
292/ Section 1505 provides in relevant part:
Obstruction of proceedings before departments,
agencies, and committees

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force,
or by any threatening letter or communication,
endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede
any witness in any proceeding pending before
any department or agency of the United States,
or in connection with any inquiry or investiga-
tion being had by either House, or any committee
of either House, or any joint committee of the
Congress; or . . .

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force,

or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress

-

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im

prisoned not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. $1505 (1976).

293/

294/

I.e., with an "improper motive;" there must be an intent to obstruct a proceeding. See United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970). Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712-16 (8th Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Browning, Inc., 572 F.2d 720, 722-25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (Bureau of Customs investigation is a "proceeding" under $1505; term has achieved broad meaning in administrative agency context). 295/ United States v. Batten, 226 F.Supp. 492, 494 (D.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912, reh. denied, 381 U.S. 930 (1965); Stein v. United States, 337 F.2d 14, 21-22 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965).

296/ United States v. Tallant, 407 F.Supp. 878 (N.D.Ga. 1975). 297/ United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976). 298/

299/

Subornation of perjury

Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury,

and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or

imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. $1622 (1976).

See, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 135 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).

300/

See notes 206-29 and accompanying text supra.