Concentrated corporate ownership
"Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in virtually all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms in surprising." "Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy."--Jacket
1 online resource (xiii, 387 pages) : illustrations
9780226536828, 0226536823
290521149
Print version:
The determinants of corporate venture capital success: organizational structure, incentives, and complementarities
Ownership structures and the decision to go public: private versus social optimality
Some of the causes and consequences of corporate ownership concentration in Canada
Corporations and taxation: a largely private matter?
Constraints on large-block shareholders
Trust and opportunism in close corporations
Waiting for the omelette to set: match-specific assets and minority oppression
Adverse selection and gains to controllers in corporate freezouts
Emerging market business groups, foreign intermediaries, and corporate governance
Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights
Inherited wealth, corporate control, and economic growth: the Canadian disease?